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Executive Summary 
This paper explores recent patterns of domestic and foreign investments in renewable 
energies. It describes drivers and features of investment in renewable energies, with special 
attention to biofuels, highlighting that these forms of energy are likely to contribute to 
competition for land and water as the latter become increasingly scarce. The analysis focuses 
on trends and developments in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Here capital is particularly needed 
not only because of low rates of savings and domestic tax collection, but also to permit the 
higher rates of growth necessary to overcome developmental and energy gaps. Despite large 
oil and gas reserves, Africa is still very far from meeting its energy needs. But the financial gap 
is not the only obstacle. The paper identifies and discusses a range of institutional, market and 
technological barriers thwarting the likelihood of meeting energy goals. Investment in 
renewable energies, especially biofuels, represents a valuable opportunity to break the unfair 
and unsustainable pattern caused by the inability of the current energy system to satisfy the 
energy needs of the poor without also compromising the ability of future generations to satisfy 
their needs. But domestic and foreign investors play distinct roles, and to help local 
populations to fully benefit from investments, land and water rights have to be clearly defined 
and governments must make strong commitments to doing so. The paper also seeks to bring 
together scattered information on investment in land, renewable energies and biofuels, 
including recent public–private partnerships (PPPs). 
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1 Introduction 
 
‘It’s time for Africa … There is an increasing recognition that the continent is on an upward 
trajectory; economically, politically and socially’ (Ernst & Young, 2011: j). Indeed, during the 
last decade, many developing countries, including in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), have attracted 
private capital. Due to limited domestic resources, the expansion of the private sector has 
been heavily dependent on external capital resources. This is particularly so in SSA, which is 
characterised by very low domestic private resources because of the low tax base and saving 
rates (OECD and AfDB, 2010). Among foreign sources, official development assistance (ODA) 
is increasingly under discussion, while foreign direct investments (FDI) and remittances are 
becoming more central. Some have argued that FDI has ‘the potential to contribute to 
accelerating growth and progress towards reaching development goals in Africa’ (Ndikumana 
and Verick, 2008). 
Against this background, this paper focuses on recent patterns of both domestic and foreign 
investment (FDI)1, with a focus on the renewable energy sector and its links with investments 
in water and land, and on sub-Saharan Africa. Foreign private capital flows surged in the early 
noughties until the 2008–2009 global economic crisis. Yet it is far from obvious that FDI had 
the expected impact on growth and development in many developing countries. A recent 
literature review (Reiter and Steensma, 2010) shows that empirical findings on the role of FDI 
in economic development remain mixed, while Wooster and Diebel (2010) find that ‘evidence 
of intrasectorial spillovers from FDI in developing countries is weak, at best’. UNCTAD (2011) 
observes that the literature on crowding in (out) of domestic investments has had 
controversial results. The heterogeneity of evidence on the developmental impact of FDI is 
explained by a wide range of arguments: institutional and legal contexts, corruption and social 
capability, the degree of the competition or complementarities with local activities, the 
technological gap, the level of human capital and development of host economies, the 
development of financial markets and receptiveness to trade, as well as investment regulation 
and labour intensity in investment sectors.2 On the one hand, FDI cannot match the rapid pace 
of development in many countries, particularly in SSA, and is often inappropriate due to the 
nature of the projects financed.3 On the other hand, the impact of FDI on growth and 
employment depends crucially on the sector through which it is channelled. In terms of its 
impact on development, the type of FDI and its structural composition matter at least as much 
as its volume.  
Bonassi et al. (2006), for instance, find that the developmental impact cannot be calculated at 
the aggregate level since the effects in different sectors are very different. If the impact of FDI 
in the primary sector is considered to be limited or even negative, further-reaching positive 
connections and spillovers are expected in the case of capital flow into the manufacturing 
sector.4 A closely linked issue is that not only do the effects on growth differ (in terms of 
stimulus on domestic consumption, employment, etc.) but so do the externalities. For 
instance, some investments in water-intensive manufacturing industries can have positive 
growth effects in the short run but negative long-term impacts because of depletion of 
resources or pollution.5  
 
 
1
 We maintain that an investment-friendly environment attracts both domestic and foreign private capital and that 
there are several synergies between private and public investment, since the latter could improve the environment (for 
instance by financing infrastructures etc) and could therefore increase private investments, initiating a virtuous circle. 
2
 See for instance, Alguacil et al., 2011; Alfaro et al., 2004; Blomstrom et al., 1994; Balasubramanyam and Sapsford, 
1996; Borensztein et al., 1998; Kemeny, 2010; Lim, 2001; Reiter and Steensma, 2010. 
3
 In SSA the needs are often higher than elsewhere, due to a higher poverty and the distance from attaining the 
MDGs. Furthermore, domestic funds are lower and foreign capital is lacking and at best concentrated in minerals/fuels, 
so that its development impact tends to be low. 
4
 See also UNCTAD, 2001; Aykut and Sayek, 2007; Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp, 2008; and Doythc and Uctum, 
2011. 
5
 There has been a debate on the so-called ‘dirty industries’, which tend to be highly water-intensive and polluting. 
When environmental laws become more restrictive in developed countries these are outsourced to developing 
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In summary, both the source (domestic or foreign) and the sector of destination (services, 
manufacturing – whether ‘dirty’ or not – raw materials and further disaggregation) are crucial 
to assessing the development impact of investments: capital can be an important and powerful 
engine for growth, but its effects depend largely on its nature, the sectors in which it is 
focused, and to what extent – if any – there is a substitution effect between foreign and 
domestic investments.6 
Against this background, this paper addresses FDI and domestic investment trends and 
characteristics by analysing specific sectors of destination. We focus on investment in 
renewable energy and in land. In the companion paper, Massa (2011) examines the drivers 
and challenges of investment in water sector.  
The paper is structured as follows. After a brief sketch of the general trends in domestic and 
foreign investment in SSA (Section 2), it discusses drivers of and barriers to investments in 
renewable energy (Section 3), trends in investments, with a focus on renewable energies and 
SSA (Section 4). It then discusses the energy-land-water nexus and the current wave of land 
investments in SSA (Section 5), and draws conclusions (Section 6). An Appendix describes 
more in detail the recent land deals in SSA. 
                                                                                                                                            
countries (often in those with weak institutions). For instance, water is used intensively in textile production (for 
cleaning, bleaching, dyeing etc), where several labour-intensive phases of productions are outsourced; also food 
manufacturing, thermal power, integrated circuits and electronic components, pulp and paper industries are water-
intensive and highly polluting and often delocalised in developing countries. See for instance, Grether and de Melo 
(2003).   
6 
Erengha (2011) estimates the dynamic links between FDI in ECOWAS and provides a detailed survey of both 
theoretical and empirical literature on relationships between these different flows. He highlights the importance of 
sector: in manufacturing crowding-in prevails, while in the primary sector it is crowding-out.  
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2 General trends and issues in (public, private and 
foreign) investment 
The last decades have witnessed significant increase both in domestic capital and in the inflows 
of foreign direct investment to developing countries, where the gap between domestic savings 
and the desired level of investment has in many cases been filled by external resources, FDI 
being one of the most important. In the 1990s, FDI represented around 30% of total 
investments, rising to 50% by 2010: a substantial increase, despite a fall in 2009 in the 
aftermath of the economic and financial crisis and a limited recovery in 2010. Furthermore, in 
2010, flows to developing and emerging countries for the first time ‘absorbed more than half of 
FDI global flows’ (OECD et al., 2011), a marked change from the past. 
Figure 2.1 shows that the last 20 years are still characterised by differences in levels and 
patterns of FDI as a percentage of GDP across groups of developing countries. 
Figure 2.1 FDI to developing countries as % of GDP 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2011 
Until 2000, middle-income countries (MICs) (especially in Latin America) benefited more from 
foreign flows, while low-income countries (LICs) in general and SSA countries in particular 
were left behind. This is explained by higher investment risk, low liberalisation and weak 
infrastructure. Since 2000, however, there has been a rapid increase of capital flows. 
According to the African Economic Outlook (2011), total investment to Africa increased almost 
fivefold from 2000 to reach US$126 billion in 2010. And, even more importantly, FDI increased 
while official development assistance (ODA) declined. Figure 2.2 below shows the evolution of 
domestic and foreign investments in SSA countries as well as the private versus public 
investments (at home). It shows that, between 1980 and 1995 private and public domestic 
capital fell while FDI was low but fairly stable. After 1995 average growth in FDI has been 
greater than domestic private flows. Public flows after a long period of stagnation (1980–2001) 
have recovered since 2005 (see also Ernst & Young, 2011). 
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Figure 2.2 Trends in FDI, private and public investment in SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Source: African Development Indicators, accessed September 2011 
Trends in domestic and foreign investment are closely connected. Ndikumana and Verick 
(2008), for example, find that in SSA the relationship runs both ways, but the impact of 
private domestic investment on FDI is stronger and more robust than the reverse relation. This 
suggests that strong private investment is likely to act as a signal and attract foreign capital. 
Given their close links, both domestic and foreign investment is likely to be driven by similar 
factors. Indeed, a widespread negative perception of SSA affected both domestic and foreign 
investments up to the early noughties (the lost decades). Things have recently changed 
(McKinsey, 2010; Ernst & Young, 2011; Radelet, 2010), as also shown by developments since 
2005 (Figure 2.2). 
FDI to some countries in SSA increased in absolute terms and as a share of GDP, fuelled by 
high commodity prices and improved macroeconomic stability and investment environment 
(World Bank Doing Business indicators, Ernst &Young, 2011). The increase was higher in Africa 
than in emerging economies in other continents (though the level is still lower, as pointed out 
by Ernst &Young, 2011).7 This growth pattern continued until the start of the global economic 
crisis in 2008–2009, which reduced the total amount of funds and led to delays or cancellations 
of investment projects (Brambila-Macias and Massa, 2010; Allen and Giovannetti, 2011). In 
SSA the risks can be high, but so can profits, with competition in some sectors comparatively 
low.8 According to Ernst & Young (2011) ‘This investment window may not remain open for 
long, but it suggests that Africa actually appears to be relatively well positioned, with the only 
emerging region clearly ahead in terms of investor perceptions at this time being Asia’ (p. 9). 
Over the last decade ‘FDI’s share of gross fixed capital formation in Africa has, at 20%, been 
 
 
7
 Since 2005 Africa has attracted more FDI than ODA. 
8
 Warnholz (2008) presents very interesting comparisons of profitability at macro and micro (firms) level, showing that 
investments in Africa (at least the countries of his sample) can be very profitable and that the main problem in 
exploiting the potential is the low level of human capital.  
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twice the global average and 8% above that of other developing countries’ (African Economic 
Outlook, 2011: 44).  
Despite the marked improvement of the last few years, there are still a number of elements 
deterring investments in African countries with respect to other developing countries: political 
risk and often inadequate human capital, macroeconomic instability, low productivity, 
exchange rate volatility and lack of infrastructure9 (Asiedu, 2001; Razafimahefa and Hamori, 
2005; Khadaroo and Seetanah, 2007; Ernst & Young, 2011). In highly unstable situations such 
as the current period of multiple crises, with uncertain environment and property rights, a 
significant obstacle to high-risk investment is that of contract enforceability and lack of 
commitment not to default. Recent research has also pointed to the importance of a sound 
legal framework and stable political environment to attract (foreign) capital, as well as to the 
influence of a country’s history of default. A related issue concerns the lack of capacity to 
manage public resources, which can lead to substantial problems of corruption.10 The existence 
of good institutions in general helps to attract – and keep – FDI (Naudé and Krugell, 2007). 
However, this view is sometimes challenged in relation to Africa: in some sectors (e.g. 
manufacturing) foreign investments ‘crowd in’ domestic investments and in others (e.g. 
primary sector) they ‘crowd them out’,11 while some specific investments, for instance those in 
land and ‘dirty industries’, are often outliers as they tend to be focused on countries with weak 
governance in order to avoid strict rules and laws. Furthermore, according to Egger and 
Winner (2005) in the presence of excess regulation, weak enforcement rules and government 
bureaucracy, corruption provides a helping hand to foreign investors rather than being a 
disruptive element).  
Data on domestic and foreign capital flows at sectoral level are at best scattered. Given 
abundant natural resources in SSA it is not surprising that extractive industries are a major 
area for foreign investment. Recently, however, many investors have started to diversify, 
investing in tourism, consumer products, construction, telecommunications, financial sectors, 
land and renewable energies (Ernst & Young, 2011:31; McKinsey, 2010; UNCTAD, 2011). 
In the following section, we analyse trends in and drivers of investment in different areas of 
renewable energy in order to assess how far the global energy market is evolving towards a 
green and equitable energy system. We focus on trends in renewable energy investment in 
SSA, with particular reference to biofuel investment. Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by 
high rates of energy poverty, a large gap in energy financing, and water scarcity, and is 
attracting large-scale land investments for biofuel projects. This review will shed some light on 
the interrelationships between energy, land and water, a nexus that is receiving growing 
attention (e.g. Bazilian et al., in press) together with a greater awareness of increasing 
scarcity of natural resources.  
 
 
9
 Adequate public infrastructure (for instance through public investment) reduces the costs of doing business and 
increases the marginal return to investment. 
10 
One solution is a mechanism that creates external controls on revenue-generating entities.  
11
 Erengha (2011) claims that this is related to the different elasticity of the demand for export in different sectors. 
There is a need for further analysis at more disaggregated level to examine these issues. 
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3 Drivers of investment in renewable energy 
Recent oil-price fluctuations around a general upward trend have revealed the growing 
vulnerability and limits of a global energy system that relies on non-renewable resources. In 
particular, the current energy system has largely failed to meet energy needs of the poor while 
also compromising the ability of future generations to satisfy their needs. The large-scale 
deployment of renewable energy could be a valuable opportunity to break out of this unfair 
and unsustainable pattern. Global investment in renewable energy grew from US$33 billion in 
2004 to US$211 billion in 2010 (UNEP and BNEF, 2011). Yet, after years of international policy 
commitments to deploy low-carbon technologies, renewable energy sources accounted for only 
16% of global final energy consumption in 2009. If we exclude traditional biomass and 
hydropower, the other renewables (solar, modern biomass, wind, geothermal, and biofuels) 
accounted for only 3% of world final energy consumption (REN21, 2011). In 2010, total 
investment in renewable energies, including hydroelectric power, reached US$233 billion, of 
which US$187 billion financed generation, approaching investment in fossil-fuel power plant, 
which was estimated at US$219 billion. However, if investment in energy also includes coal, 
gas and other upstream investment costs the estimate rises to US$1.2 trillion in 2010 (UNEP 
and BNEF, 2011). Thus, at global level, the renewable energy sector is growing fast but from a 
very small base. A series of factors have contributed to this pattern.  
3.1 Factors which boost investment in renewable energy 
The role of fossil fuels ‘scarcity’: One factor that is fostering renewable technologies 
investment is the recent trends and future projections of the high and growing price of fossil 
fuels. Until the 1990s and early 2000s, the global economy was characterised by a polarisation 
between a narrow elite of countries in the ‘North’ that import commodities and energy from 
the ‘South’, which supplied these goods in a context of resource abundance and high price 
elasticity. Development in the North has been characterised by unsustainably high energy 
intensity. The emergence of a group of new industrialised small countries did not alter this 
equilibrium and supply continued to accommodate increased demand, which contained the 
effect on prices – with the exception of the 1970s energy crises, which were caused mainly by 
geo-political factors. This situation is changing. The New Industrialised Countries (mainly China 
and India) are real giants with huge populations. Moreover, starting from weaker 
environmental regulations and technological development, their production tends to be highly 
energy-intensive. As a result, their economic boom has brought a rapid increase in demand for 
energy and primary commodities, leading to rising oil prices (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1 Energy and oil price index (base year 2005) 
 
Source: IMF 
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This pattern is reflected in global trends of energy use and demand. Between 1993 and 2008, 
world demand for oil grew by 27% compared to a rise of 5% in the previous 15 years; the 
Asian Tigers’ contribution to the global oil demand is quite modest in the entire period, while 
Brazil, India and China account for a significant and increasing share of the increased demand 
(Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2 World oil demand (1000 barrels/day) 
 
Source: International Energy Agency 
Per-capita energy use in HICs has been always between four and ten times higher than in the 
rest of the world (WDI data): they represent less than 17% of the global population but 
account for almost 48% of global energy use (Figure 3.3). 
Figure 3.3 Regional distribution of energy use and of population, 2008 
 
Source: WDI 
Moreover, at regional level, HICs and South Asia (mainly driven by India) were until the mid-
2000s the only net energy importers (Figure 3.4). With China’s booming energy demand, 
whose share of global energy use rose from 11% in 2000 to almost 18% in 2008, the East Asia 
and Pacific region has been a net energy importer since 2006.  
The growth in world energy demand is projected to reach more than 40% more than current 
levels by 2030 (OPEC, 2010). Even assuming cautious implementation of current government 
policy commitments, oil demand will rise constantly: in this scenario, energy demand is 
estimated to grow by 36% between 2008 and 2035 and fossil fuels will continue to represent 
over 50% (OECD/IEA, 2010). 
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Figure 3.4 Net energy imports (% of energy use) 
 
Source: WDI 
Other supply-side factors can push oil prices up. Public opinion and international NGOs exert 
growing pressure to consider environmental and social damage often associated with resources 
extraction. This greater awareness of externalities in the production of fossil fuels can make 
them more costly or create supply constraints. With the exception of Latin America, in non-
OPEC countries, for instance, the supply of oil crude and natural gas liquids (NGLs) is 
forecasted to flatten or decline and in OECD countries especially, increasing costs and stricter 
regulations are regarded as possible factors that will contribute to a decline in crude oil 
production (OPEC, 2010). In sum, although reserves of fossil fuels are not yet scarce they are 
no longer available at such low cost. According to the International Energy Agency (OECD/IEA, 
2010), because supply and demand are becoming less sensitive to oil prices this will lead to 
price rises. Indeed, in the last few years, the correlation between price commodities and world 
economic growth rate has increased and, as noted by Lopez (2011), for the first time in 
history, the recent oil-price shock was linked to a spike in demand rather than to political 
factors or other exogenous factors.  
Energy security: governments’ reluctance to depend on the Middle East and on oil-producing 
countries facing political turmoil has contributed to the development of renewable energy. 
Renewable energy sources are better distributed across regions than fossil fuels, which tend to 
be highly concentrated. Moreover, the production of renewable energy has spread worldwide, 
especially in Europe and Asia. This geographical expansion increases the trust that renewable 
energy markets are less vulnerable to political instability and the policy options of specific 
countries (REN21, 2011). 
Declining costs and competitiveness gains of several renewable energy technologies: 
production and distribution costs may constrain the competitiveness and economic viability of 
renewable energies. Indeed, the IPCC (2011) estimates that the average lifetime costs of 
many renewable energy-generating systems are higher than current energy prices, although 
there are large variations across regions and sources of energy. However, the reduced cost of 
solar PV, wind turbines and biofuel processing has contributed to the growth of the renewable 
sector (REN21, 2011) to the extent that some applications are becoming economically viable. 
BNEF analyses show that prices of solar modules, for instance, have more than halved since 
2008 and that small solar projects are more competitive, especially in sunny places (such as 
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Italy and Turkey) where prices have gone down to US$22 cents/kwh (BNEF, 2011). A World 
Bank study (Kulichenko and Wirth, 2011) estimates that the costs of several components for 
concentrating solar thermal power will decrease by between 15% and 30% by 2020. Learning 
by doing and economies of scale are expected to further reduce costs as the technology 
spreads. Some promising signals on competitiveness also come from developing countries. In 
a study on Ethiopia, Ghana and Kenya, Deichmann et al. (2011) find that in several rural 
areas, although decentralised renewable power has a higher unit production cost than fossil 
electricity, it is competitive compared to centralised power provision, usually based on fossil 
fuels, once the cost of extending transmission and distribution are taken into account. Nouni et 
al. (2008) found similar results in areas of rural India.  
International efforts to combat climate change: the IPCC estimates that fossil fuels 
contribute to more than half of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GhG) concentrations that are 
the main cause of the global warming. The extensive deployment of renewable energies is one 
of the main options to mitigate GhG emissions. Existing evidence shows that, in general, 
renewable energy technologies produce significantly lower lifecycle GhG emissions than those 
generated by non-renewable resources, although the GhG balance for bioenergy generation 
critically depends on land-use management and indirect effects in terrestrial carbon stocks 
(IPCC, 2011).  
It is estimated (OECD/IEA 2010) that, in order to meet the goal agreed at the 2009 UN 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen to limit the global temperature increase to 2°C, 
over 60% of the contribution to reducing global warming between 2010 and 2035 should come 
from renewable plants improvements, even when greater energy efficiency is included. The 
international agenda against climate change, therefore, is pushing for a large-scale 
deployment of renewable energy technologies.  
MDG agenda: increasing awareness that the attainment of the MDGs depends on the 
development of renewable energy is another factor behind investment in this sector, since it 
can contribute to enhancing access to reliable and affordable energy in poor countries and for 
poor populations. Reducing energy poverty is critical to the MDGs since energy is behind all 
human activities. Several studies and institutions have underlined the link between each MDG 
and access to modern energy sources, renewable or non-renewable (Modi et al., 2005; GNESD 
2007; Bazilian et al., 2010; OECD/IEA, 2010). Renewable energy, however, presents several 
advantages. Many applications are devised to produce decentralised electricity and energy and 
several renewable energy sources, such as wind, solar irradiance, crop residues and animal 
wastes are often widespread in rural areas. This means that they could be harnessed to 
provide energy to rural areas, which are usually the poorest and the most excluded from 
energy access since the cost of grid connection and fuel transport seriously impede access and 
investment. Some renewable energy applications (such as solar energy for water heating, 
bioenergy for transport, heating, cooking and lighting) can also serve informal settlements in 
peri-urban areas where many households are not served by the electricity grid. Finally, in non-
oil-producing countries the development of renewable energy can reduce dependence on 
imports of oil, coal and natural gas (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 The role of investment in modern renewable energy for achieving the MDGs 
 
 
MDGs 
 
Investment in modern renewable energy 
 
MDG 1: Eradicate 
extreme poverty 
 Access to modern, affordable and sustainable energy and electricity sources can enhance household 
incomes by increasing production and work hours, labour productivity, educational attainment and health 
conditions and by reducing the burden of time-consuming domestic labour.  
 Energy access enhances returns to labour and productive assets as well as labour and business 
opportunities since energy services such as lighting, heating, cooking, locomotion, mechanical power, 
transport and telecommunications are essential for economic activities and socioeconomic development.  
 Providing more energy for agriculture, irrigation and transport will increase food production and food 
security, thus helping alleviate world hunger. 
MDG 2 and 3: Achieve 
universal primary 
education and promote 
gender equality and 
empower women 
 Access to energy can reduce child labour by increasing adults’ productivity. 
 Access to energy reduces time-consuming domestic work needed to collect traditional fuels, fetch water, 
prepare food or perform other labour-intensive chores. This may enable children to attend school and to 
study at home. Women can be more productive and also have more opportunities to participate in social 
and community life, which may contribute to their economic and social empowerment.  
 Street lighting improves safety, facilitating children’s school attendance and women’s participation in 
community activities. 
 Electricity facilitates access to telecommunication services. 
MDG 4, 5 and 6: Reduce 
child mortality; improve 
maternal health; combat 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases  
 Substitution of cooking, heating and lighting systems based on traditional biomass with modern 
appliances reduces indoor air pollution, which causes respiratory diseases, and facilitates the use of 
boiled water, which reduces the risk of waterborne diseases, a major cause of child mortality.     
 Pumping and treating water, which requires energy, contributes to a clean water supply.  
 Having electricity enables health facilities to stay open longer, maintain a cold chain, and improve their 
general functioning. Transport and communication facilitate access to healthcare and emergency medical 
services and information campaigns to combat preventable diseases.  
MDG 7: Ensure 
environmental 
sustainability 
 Most modern renewable energy sources produce fewer GhG emissions and are less polluting, and make 
less intensive use of water and natural resources than non-renewable and traditional biomass energy. 
Thus, their large-scale development can contribute to global and local environmental sustainability.  
 
Source: Adapted from UN Energy (2005) and OECD/IEA (2010) 
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All these factors create market incentives for investment in the renewable energy sector and 
encourage governments to introduce enabling policies such as incentives, subsidies and 
targets. Between 2005 and 2011, the number of countries adopting targets or policy measures 
to favour renewable energies rose from 55 to 119, over half of which are developing countries 
(REN21, 2011). Policy support seems to be one of the main drivers of investments in 
renewable energy in view of the large range of market policy, institutional and information 
barriers the sector faces. It is widely recognised that without government support the 
renewable energy industry cannot take off and that governments have played a crucial role in 
fostering the development and deployment of renewable energy technologies. 
3.2 Barriers to investment in renewable energy 
Recent studies suggest that a complete transition to a renewable energy system is 
economically and technically feasible. Jacobson and Delucchi (2011) simulated an energy 
system that could meet the world’s energy needs from wind, water, and sunlight. They find 
that energy costs might be similar as today’s, and that the development of such a system is 
unlikely to be constrained by the availability of raw materials such as steel, platinum or 
lithium. Fthenakis et al. (2009) find that solar energy alone has the technical, geographical, 
and economic potential to provide more than one third of US energy needs by 2050. Despite 
these encouraging findings, several barriers still hinder the large-scale development of 
renewable energy, especially in the poorest countries. 
Unfavourable relative prices: subsidies to conventional energy, cheap gas and 
exclusion of externalities: Fiscal support for fossil fuels, such as fuel subsidies, exploration 
concession waivers, investment tax holidays, export guarantees and soft loans, still obtain in 
many countries, especially but not exclusively in oil-rich nations. In non-OECD countries, 
governments use subsidies on the consumption and production of fuel to enhance access to 
energy, reduce dependence on traditional biomass energy and sustain economic growth and 
employment. Consumption subsidies are rare in OECD countries, but production subsidies are 
quite widespread – although in 2009, G-20 leaders committed themselves to phasing out and 
rationalising fossil-fuel subsidies. These financing mechanisms work against investment in 
renewable energy since they undermine their competitiveness and discourage the transition to 
clean energy production. To illustrate their importance, the IEA estimates that in 2009 
government subsidies for fossil-fuel final consumption and electric power generation amounted 
to US$312 billion globally12 compared to only US$57 billion in total government support for 
electricity from renewables and for biofuels. Interestingly, the average annual investment 
required to achieve universal access to modern forms of energy by 2030, estimated at US$36 
billion, would be less than 8% of 2009 global consumption subsidies for fossil fuels (OECD/IEA 
2010).  
Natural gas represents an important challenge to renewable energy. According to UNEP and 
BNEF (2011), low prices of natural gas have undermined renewable energy projects especially 
in the wind and solar sectors. If such competition grows, given that increased demand, 
abundant recoverable resources, and increasing international trade in natural gas make its 
prospects very promising (OECD/IEA 2011).  
The pricing of different energy sources exludes both externalities of energy production and 
uses and their potential contribution to reducing GhG emissions or other adverse social and 
environmental impacts. A study conducted in Senegal, for instance, shows, that in three 
remote rural regions, once environmental externalities are taken into account, the electricity 
from PV technologies costs less than energy from grid extension (Thiam, 2010).  
Costs and financing barriers: as mentioned above, several renewables are not cost-
competitive in current market conditions. The levelised cost of electricity for renewable energy 
sources, in many cases, has a higher range than that of traditional power sources (IPCC 
2011).13 Moreover, high up-front capital costs, immaturity of technologies, uncertainties 
 
 
12
 Note that 37 countries account for 95% of global subsidies for consumption of fossil fuels.  
13
 A recent World Bank study (Kulichenko and Wirth, 2011) finds that in several emerging economies (such as in 
India, Morocco, and South Africa) the levelised cost of electricity for concentrating solar thermal power are still too 
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regarding prices and regulatory frameworks, inadequate data and mapping of the technical 
potential of renewables, can increase the financial and premium risks of the projects, which 
heightens investors’ perception of risk and hampers their access to financing.  
Costs are decreasing, but most analysts and researchers agree that policy support is needed in 
order to make renewable energy more competitive and promote its large-scale development 
(IPCC, 2011; OECD/IEA, 2010, 2011; UNEP and MISI, 2009; Hamilton, 2010). Based on 
evidence from MENA countries, India and South Africa, Kulichenko and Wirth (2011), for 
instance, underscore several regulatory frameworks that could help in improving the economic 
and financial affordability of concentrating solar thermal power, such as properly designed 
feed-in tariff schemes, combined with auctioning mechanisms, Renewable Portfolio Standard 
schemes, concessional financing, sovereign guarantees for power purchase agreements for 
solar thermal power projects. Looking at a different aspect of renewable energy 
competitiveness and diffusion, namely innovation capacity, Johnstone et al. (2010) show that 
public policies, from public expenditures on R&D to feed-in-tariffs, and renewable energy 
certificates, had a positive influence on patent activity in OECD countries over the period 
1978–2003.  
Integration of renewable energy with the current energy system: This requires 
institutional and market changes as well as the adaptation and expansion of current 
infrastructure. Substantial efforts are required in order to create hybrid, flexible and integrated 
energy systems since distribution, variability, production scale and techniques greatly differ 
from those of dominant fossil-fuel energy systems. Integration into the current energy system, 
therefore, can represent a narrow bottleneck for the large-scale development of renewable 
energy. Available evidence based on stakeholder surveys in ASEAN countries show that grid-
connection and infrastructure barriers are major concerns for investors in the renewable 
energy sector (Ölz and Beerepoot, 2010). Where conventional power grids are 
underdeveloped, as in most SSA countries, the challenges to create efficient and reliable 
energy networks with a high renewable energy penetration are even greater.  
Low competition, monopoly or oligopoly market structure: In several countries, energy 
and power sectors are characterised by a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure. Foster and 
Briceño-Garmendia (2008) find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in SSA manage the 
largest share of public expenditure on infrastructure, the power sector included, and Nkwetta 
et al. (2010) observe that in many cases national energy supply is based on a monopoly. Ölz 
and Beerepoot (2010) underscore that in the ASEAN region the power sector is characterised 
by the dominance of state-owned or controlled utilities. In these contexts, independent power 
producers might face serious entry-market obstacles due to low competition, centralised 
infrastructure, institutional arrangements and prevailing standards, which are conceived for 
concentrated market structures.  
Low awareness of benefits, information barriers, lack of human capital: In addition to 
the capacity to pay, consumers’ and policy-makers’ awareness of potential benefits, 
applications, technically and economically feasibility of renewable energy technologies are a 
key determinant of political commitment to their development as well as of demand for 
renewable energy.14 These factors, in turn, can exert a negative influence on investors’ 
decisions. At the same time, the shortage of trained technical personnel to operate and 
maintain the energy systems and inadequate expertise on the part of energy regulators can 
discourage demand and investments in the sector (Ölz and Beerepoot, 2010).  
Social barriers: Popular opposition to the use or production of renewable energy can be 
another barrier to investment. Cooking habits, for instance, help to explain why in some cases 
the installed improved fuelwood stoves are not used (Bailis et al., 2009; Neudoerffer et al., 
2001; Zuk et al., 2007). Concerns about the implications for biodiversity and the landscape 
can also undermine social acceptance of renewable energy plants, but the strongest resistance 
is likely to come from population groups claiming land and water rights. As discussed in the 
                                                                                                                                            
high and projects at current investment costs have a rate of return that make it impossible to meet commercial 
infrastructure investment requirements. 
14
 One of the key messages of 2011 Bloomberg New Energy Finance Summit, for instance, points out that decision-
makers are insufficiently informed about the options, progress and benefits of renewable energy (BNEF, 2011). 
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section on land and biofuel investment, the expansion of the area under biofuel cultivation can 
reduce or hamper local uses of land and water. While they are not the focus of this paper, 
large hydropower plants and dams can also have devastating effects on downstream 
communities and in causing population displacement.15 
 
 
15
 The Report of World Commission on Dams (2000) is clear in this sense. One of its main findings is that, despite the 
significant contribution of dams to human development, ‘[i]n too many cases an unacceptable and often unnecessary 
price has been paid to secure those benefits, especially in social and environmental terms, by people displaced, by 
communities downstream, by taxpayers and by the natural environment’ (p. xxviii).  
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4 Global and regional trends in renewable energy 
investment 
The key role of policy measures, specific institutional arrangements, coordination and 
integration between different energy sources and existing energy networks, and access to 
capital and information is mirrored by the trends and spatial distribution of renewable energy 
investment. High-income countries and some emerging economies, which enjoy greater policy 
support, purchasing power and investment capacity, lead the sector, while poorer areas are 
still at the margins of this growing market.  
4.1 Total investments16  
As mentioned above, the renewable energy sector is experiencing rapid growth: between 2004 
and 2010, global investment rose at a compound annual growth rate of 36% (UNEP and BNEF, 
2011). Overall, the impact of financial crisis was relatively contained, albeit with some 
variations across regions, technologies and types of investment.  
The total investment in renewable energy companies and utility-scale (medium and large) 
generation and biofuel projects (Figure 4.1) rebounded in 2010 after a downturn in 2009, 
which was mainly due to a 18% decline in investment in Europe and USA as a result of the 
financial and economic crisis. However, the global trend in total renewable energy investment 
was constantly positive thanks to an increase in government expenditure in R&D, rapid 
expansion of small projects in some HICs17 and, above all, China’s performance, which more 
than doubled financial investment in renewable energy between 2008 and 2010, from US$23.9 
billion to US$48.9 billion. 
Figure 4.1 Global trends in total financial investment in renewable energy (US$ 
billion) 
 
 
 
16
 Figures in this section are drawn from the Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s (BNEF) data reported in Global Trends 
in Renewable Energy Investment 2011 (UNEP and BNEF, 2011) unless otherwise specified. Renewable energy projects 
include all biomass, geothermal, and wind-generation projects of more than 1 MW, all hydro projects of between 0.5 
and 50 MW, all solar power projects of more than 0.3 MW, all ocean energy projects, and all biofuel projects with a 
capacity of 1 million litres or more per year. BNEF defines utility-scale solar parks as greater than 500 kW in capacity. 
17
 Notably Germany, Italy and the USA. 
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Investment trends in the renewable energy sector investment also vary across technologies 
(Figure 4.2.a-b). Biofuel investment rose to US$20 billion in 2006–2008, in conjunction with 
the oil price shock, but has since reverted to the 2005 level (around US$6 billion) with the 
persistence of the global economic crisis. Investment in biomass and waste-to-energy sectors 
was less affected by the economic crisis as it steadily increased over the 2004–2010 period. 
Investment in small-hydro, geothermal and marine energy presents a stable trend fluctuating 
around much lower levels (US$4 billion, US$1.4 billion and US$0.2 billion, respectively). The 
dominant sectors in investment trends are wind and solar energy. The global economic 
downturn did not affect total investment in wind energy, which benefited from mega-projects 
in China and rose from US$12 billion to US$94 billion between 2004 and 2011, accounting for 
53% of all investment in renewables over the period (Figure 4.3). Starting from a very low 
base (US$0.4 billion in 2004), solar energy saw investment peaking at US$33 billion in 2008. 
Despite a 24% slowdown in 2009, it still attracted about 20% of all investment in renewable 
energy over the period, the second highest by sector. 
Figure 4.2 a-b Financial new investment in renewable energy by technology (US$ 
billion) 
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Figure 4.3 Global financial new investment in 2004–2010 by technology (US$ billion 
and % shares) 
 
The renewable energy sector is also characterised by a pronounced geographical 
concentration. In 2010, four countries accounted for about 70% of existing and added capacity 
in wind power and PV solar markets, while four countries covered more than 75% of global 
biofuel production and solar water heating installed capacity (Figure 4.4). China leads the wind 
and solar hot-water sectors, the USA accounts for 20% of total wind capacity and it is the top 
producer of biofuels, followed by Brazil. Germany is one of the top markets in solar PV and 
wind power capacity and investment. Given that the technical potential and supply of 
renewable energies tend to be more evenly distributed than fossil fuels, such a spatial 
concentration of renewable energy production and investment indicate that institutional, policy 
and economic factors hinder the expansion of this sector. 
Figure 4.4 a-b-c-d Investment in renewable energy by technology by top four 
countries and Rest of World (RoW) 
 
Source: REN21, 2011. Data cover all biomass and wind-generation projects of more than 
1MW, all solar projects of more than 0.3MW, and all biofuel projects with a capacity of 1 
million litres or more per year. 
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Trends in renewable energy investment exhibit the same spatial concentration. As shown in 
Figure 4.5, Europe, North America and the largest emerging economies (Brazil, China and 
India) attract the bulk of global investment in renewables. In 2010, all other countries 
combined accounted for about 12% of total new investment, although they saw a growing 
interest in the renewable energy sector. In South America (Brazil excluded), investment 
increased from US$0.1 billion in 2004 to US$2.1 billion in 2009 before jumping to US$6.2 
billion in 2010. Africa and the Middle East also experienced a strong acceleration of renewable 
energy investment in the last years, but from a far lower base. 
Figure 4.5 Trends in total financial investment in renewable energy in selected areas 
(US$ billion) 
 
4.2 FDI in renewable and alternative energy sector 
It is not easy to analyse the role of FDI in the renewable energy sector since data 
disaggregated by country and sector are not always collected systematically or are not fully 
comparable with information on total energy investment flows. We try to delineate trends in 
FDI in renewable energy using the fDi Markets database of the Financial Times Ltd, one of the 
most widely used databases on greenfield investment projects. Figure 4.6 reports the 
estimated global value of greenfield FDI projects in alternative and renewable energy 
compared to other sectors, by sector from 2003 to 2010, while Figure 4.7 shows the number 
of FDI projects in renewable and non-renewable energy sector over the same period.  
According to fDi Markets data, the total value of greenfield FDI projects in alternative and 
renewable energy over the 2004–2010 period is estimated at US$312 billion, while Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance’s (BNEF) data recorded US$430 billion of asset financing18 of utility-scale 
renewable energy projects in the same period. Thus, FDI seems to play an important role in 
financing new projects, but the evidence does not permit any further conclusions to be drawn 
about the contribution of foreign capital to renewable energy investment because of the 
difference in coverage between the two data sources.19 
  
 
 
18
 Asset financing is defined as all money invested in renewable energy generation projects, whether from internal 
company balance sheets, from debt finance, or from equity finance. 
19 
For instance, the fDi Markets database, unlike the Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s (BNEF) database, includes only 
greenfield projects and does not specify upper limit of project scale, covering also large hydropower plants. 
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Figure 4.6 Value of greenfield FDI projects in energy sector 2003–2010 (US$ million) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2011) based on Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets. Data refer to estimated 
capital investment. 
Figure 4.7 Number of greenfield FDI projects in energy sector, 2003–2010 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2011) based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets. Note: 
Data refer to estimated capital investment. 
The estimated value of greenfield FDI projects in renewable energy surged from US$8.2 in 
2003 to more than US$93 billion in 2008. In this period, renewable energy was one of the 
fastest-growing sectors in terms of greenfield FDI projects, together with business activities, 
non-renewable energy and, to a lesser extent, food, beverages and tobacco. Starting from 
very low levels, in 2008–2009 renewable energy greenfield FDI reached values that were 
similar to those of other important sectors, such as machinery and electronic equipment, but 
also transport equipment and transport, storage and communications.  
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Compared to FDI in non-renewable energy, renewables still lag behind, but the gap is 
narrowing: while FDI in coal, oil and natural gas were about 23 times higher than FDI in 
renewable energy in 2003, the gap has now decreased to about 3 times and the recovery is 
even more marked in terms of number of projects.  
Unlike total renewable energy investments, which have been fairly resilient during the current 
economic crisis, greenfield FDI projects were heavily hit and saw a drop both in 2009 (-14%) 
and 2010 (-49%) when their estimated value declined to US$40.7 billion. The number of 
projects followed the same trend: almost doubling in 2008 and then returning to pre-boom 
levels.
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5 Energy poverty and energy investment in sub-
Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the world’s most energy-poor regions, despite its technical 
potential. The continent has almost 10% of the world’s oil reserves (UNECA, 2011). Some 
countries have been important oil producers (notably Angola and Nigeria) for many years and, 
recently, the petroleum industry is showing increased interest in oil reserves in West Africa. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, for instance, are already hosting intense oil 
exploration. In Ghana, there was an important discovery in 2007. Analysts believe that this 
region might represent a new frontier for non-OPEC oil production, although political and 
economic risks and the unfavourable investment climate make difficult to predict when 
investment and production will really take off (EIA, 2010). But Africa’s real energy wealth is its 
solar, wind, water and bioenergy resources. According to REN21 data, Africa and the Middle 
East have about 57% and 8% of the world’s potential solar and wind power respectively 
(Ecofys NL – REN21, 2008). Africa has also a large hydropower capability that is less exploited 
than in other regions: the continent accounts for 11% of exploitable capability but it hosts 3% 
of world current installed hydropower capacity (World Energy Council, 2010a).  
Despite this potential energy wealth, the quality and quantity of energy supply in most of SSA 
is very poor. About 80% of the population relies on traditional biomass fuel for cooking, the 
largest share in the world (OECD/IEA 2010). Moreover, 585 million people (69% of the 
population) lack access to electricity, representing more than 40% of the 1.4 billion people 
worldwide who live without electricity. Energy access is particularly problematic in rural areas 
where 80% of those lacking any electricity supply live. Finally, all SSA countries, with the 
exception of South Africa, are in the bottom half of the Energy Development Index ranking, an 
aggregate indicator which takes into account per-capita electricity and energy consumption, 
modern fuels use and access to electricity (OECD/IEA 2010).  
Sub-Saharan Africa’s energy sector faces multiple challenges: low generation capacity, high 
costs, unreliable and underdeveloped energy infrastructure and a large financing gap (AfDB, 
2010). Electricity networks are often weak and unstable, affected by high power losses and 
failures, and are usually made up of non-interconnected systems (Nkwetta et al., 2010). The 
resulting frequent power cuts affect agricultural and manufacturing productivity. Hidden costs 
due to under-pricing, under-collection and unaccounted losses in the power sector are also 
widespread. Briceño-Garmendia et al. (2008) observe that inefficiency improvements could 
considerably enhance government revenues, as they estimate that average annual hidden 
costs amount to 0.8% of Africa’s GDP.  
Finally, low energy consumption is combined with particularly constrained systems of energy 
production and distribution. This weakness further hampers energy security and aggravates 
exposure to international market fluctuations. Indeed, most SSA countries are net energy 
importers20 (Figure 5.1), although the region as a whole is a net energy exporter.  
While SSA countries need to invest in energy generation, this is not enough in the absence of 
other measures. Such investment does not necessarily reduce energy poverty. In the poorest 
countries, where grid-based access to energy is particularly low, improvements in power-
generating capacity face greater obstacles to translating this into greater access, and are more 
likely to increase supply to those who already have access (Bazilian et al., 2011). There is also 
a need for investment in maintenance, expansion and development of power grids, in energy 
efficiency, in capacity-building and in setting alternative financing and incentives mechanisms 
which are appropriate to different technologies and to different types of user (large and small 
firms, poor households, rural and urban population). 
  
 
 
20
 Forty-three African countries are energy net importers (Amigun et al., 2011). 
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Figure 5.1 Net energy imports in sub-Saharan African countries – 2008 (Mtoe) 
 
Source: IEA (2010), ’World energy balances’, IEA World Energy Statistics and Balances. 
Recent estimates (Briceño-Garmendia et al., 2008) find that SSA’s aggregate power 
infrastructure needs between 2006 and 2015 – both for new investment and operations and 
maintenance – amount to about US$43 billion a year (7% of GDP), significantly higher than 
the annual average spending of US$11 billion in the 2001–2006 period. Capital expenditure in 
energy infrastructure accounted for US$4.6 billion a year (about 40% of total spending). New 
investments in energy infrastructure were, therefore, similar to those in the water and 
sanitation sector (US$4.6 billion a year) but about half of the capital expenditure in the 
transport sector (US$8.4 billion a year). With an average annual expenditure of US$2.4 billion, 
domestic public finance was the largest source of funds for the energy sector, followed by non-
OECD financiers (mainly the Export-Import Bank of China) and by ODA which, on average, 
provided US$1.1 billion (24%) and US$0.7 billion (15%) a year respectively. The contribution 
of the private sector was quite low: US$0.5 billion (11%). 
Renewable energy has many advantages for improving access to affordable and clean energy. 
It reduces the dependence on imported fuels, enhancing national trade balance and energy 
security. It has been calculated that decentralised renewable technologies are cost-competitive 
in remote and large rural areas of SSA (Deichmann et al., 2011) and they could therefore play 
a key role in enhancing rural energy access. Finally, large-scale deployment of wind, solar and 
hydropower energy could also reduce dependence on traditional biomass, which is harmful for 
health, the environment and workloads, especially for women. A decline in the use of biomass 
energy could also alleviate pressure on water resources: according to some estimates, Africa 
produces only 9% of world’s total primary energy, but its energy production consumes more 
than one-third of water used in the energy sector worldwide (data referred to 2005), mainly 
due to the extensive use of biomass energy (World Energy Council, 2010b).  
Renewable energy markets in SSA are still largely underdeveloped. In 2009, for instance, SSA 
(South Africa excluded) produced only 74 GWh of electricity from solar, wind, tide and wave 
compared to 51480 GWh in all non-OECD countries (IEA, 2011). 
5.1 Trends in renewable energy investment in sub-Saharan Africa 
Data on renewable energy investment in Africa are sparse, largely incomplete and seldom 
comparable. This section will use different data sources in order to provide a snapshot of the 
trends in and characteristics of Africa’s renewable energy market.  
Information on medium and large projects highlights that investment in renewable energy 
(large hydropower excluded) is still very low but is growing fast: in 2010 (Figure 4.5) it 
jumped to US$3.6 billion from US$0.7 billion in the previous year. The data include North 
African countries and show that the boom was geographically concentrated. In both Egypt and 
Kenya investment rose to $1.3 billion (UNEP and BNEF, 2011). UNEP and BNEF (2011) report 
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that, in the same year, other countries (notably Cape Verde, Morocco and Zambia) have seen 
some advances in renewable energy, but in 2010 Egypt and Kenya accounted for more than 
70% of all money invested in Africa’s renewable energy market. 
UNEP and BNEF data on small-scale generation projects do not include solar water heaters, 
biomass and other heating systems that might be more appropriate in developing countries. 
The available evidence suggests, however, that the recent surge in small-scale generation 
projects, which might enhance energy access in rural areas through decentralised and 
distributed energy generation, has been dominated by HICs and MICs. Investment in small 
distributed capacity rose from US$13 billion in 2007 to US$60 billion in 2010, but the boom 
was driven by ten countries (Germany, Italy, the USA, Japan, France, Czech Republic, 
Australia, China, Belgium, Israel, in order of magnitude) accounting for almost US$53 billion. 
Data on greenfield investment confirm the minor role of SSA in the clean energy market. 
Mirroring the regional trends in FDI flows, as shown in Figure 5.2, between 2003 and 2009, 
SSA attracted less FDI in renewable energy than all the other regions, with the sole exception 
of Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
Figure 5.2 Total value of greenfield FDI projects in renewable energy sector by 
region, 2003–2009* (US$ millions) 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on information from Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets 
(www.fDimarkets.com). Note: the secondary axis refers to the category ‘All sectors’. *2009 
data include only first months of the year. 
Recent years have seen an acceleration of FDI in renewable energy in SSA (see Figure 5.3), 
though the boom has been more pronounced in East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central 
Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
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Figure 5.3 Trends in greenfield FDI projects in renewable energy sector by region, 
2003–2008 (US$ millions) 
 
Source: Authors' computations based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets 
(www.fDimarkets.com). 
Moreover, within SSA, greenfield FDI was concentrated in a small group of countries, while in 
the remaining countries there have been limited or negligible new renewable energy projects 
financed by foreign capital (Figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.4 Value of greenfield FDI projects in renewable energy sector in Sub-
Saharan Africa’s country, 2003-2009*(US$ millions) 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets 
(www.fDimarkets.com). *2009 data include only first months of the year. 
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6 Biofuel production in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
energy-land-water nexus 
Benefits and potentials vary across types of renewable energy sources and some are 
contested. Biofuels, in particular, are at the centre of a heated debate. This section discusses 
the development of biofuels in SSA. While traditional biomass is the main source of energy in 
the continent, processed bioenergy, such as biofuel and biogas, are regarded as new and more 
efficient form of carbon-based renewable energy that can contribute to tackling the persistent 
energy crisis (on the classification of bioenergy sources see Box 5.1). Liquid biofuels have also 
the advantage that they can be used in the transport sector without significantly modifying the 
existing infrastructure. At the same time, they can be used for non-transport applications 
(cooking, lighting, and electricity-generation). Foreign investors have been showing increasing 
interest in Africa’s potential biofuels production, as the recent wave of large-scale land 
investments for biofuel production. The European Union (EU), in particular, has played an 
important role in this trend as European countries will need to imports biofuels in order to 
meet the binding targets set by the EU Renewable Energy Directive according to which by 
2020 at least 10% of each Member State’s transport fuel must come from renewable sources. 
The biofuel sector is expected to be attractive in several African countries because of promising 
export opportunities, especially in the EU market where several African countries enjoy 
preferential access, but also for positive projections in the domestic markets: the prices of fuel 
in SSA are about double those in the most competitive markets, demand for transport fuels is 
rising, and cooking applications and off-grid electricity generation in rural areas could receive 
higher attention in future (Mitchell, 2011).  
The anticipated benefits of biofuels production include diversification and improvement of 
income sources in rural areas, direct and indirect employment creation, improvement in energy 
security and reduced dependence on oil imports, foreign currency earnings from biofuel 
exports and reduction in GhG emissions. Despite these potential opportunities, biofuels 
development in SSA and elsewhere is very controversial and even its proponents warns of the 
economic, social and environmental risks. Biofuel expansion might (a) push up food prices21 
and compete with food production, undermining food security; (b) contribute little to energy 
security as the sector is mainly export-oriented; (c) create frictions among competing uses for 
land and water uses and place pressure on water resources; (d) create incentives for 
deforestation, and have severe environmental impacts such as water pollution and soil 
degradation and a negative carbon balance.22 The risk of water stress is particularly alarming 
as the continent already suffers high levels of water scarcity. The water footprint of biofuels, 
especially the first-generation ones, is much larger than that of fossil fuels (Gerbens-Leenes et 
al., 2009; King and Webber, 2008).23 Finally, the fact that large corporations operating 
simultaneously in the energy, animal feed and OGM seeds sectors are increasingly interested 
in biofuel production and commercialisation (Borras et al., 2010; Neville and Dauvergne, 2010) 
has given rise to concerns about the equity and sustainability of this transition. 
  
 
 
21
 Timilsina and Shrestha (2010), following an extensive review of recent studies on the impact of biofuel growth on 
food prices and on the 2008 food price shock, observe that there is a general consensus on the fact that biofuel 
expansion exerts upwards pressure on food prices, but there is a considerable variation in the estimates of the 
magnitude of this impact.  
22
 As noted by Delucchi (2010), estimates of net GHG emissions of biofuels depend on assumptions on fossil fuels 
used in cultivation of biomass feedstocks and in the production of the biofuel; the amount of nitrogen fertiliser applied, 
the treatment of carbon emissions from land use change. There is a consensus that net mitigation of GHG emissions is 
positive when land conversions for biofuel production are not considered, but the contribution of biofuels in mitigating 
climate change pressure is largely contested when land use changes are computed. See Timilsina and Shrestha 
(2010), for a detailed literature review.  
23 The water footprint of biomass energy varies across climate conditions, agricultural production systems and the 
crops used, but Gerbens-Leenes et al. (2009) calculate that, on average, it is 70 to 400 times larger than that of the 
other energy sources (nuclear, crude oil, solar thermal, wind, natural gas energy). Several estimates suggest that 
expansion of biofuel production, with its large water requirements, will increase demand and competition for water 
(Berndes, 2002; De Fraiture et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2009; Galan-del-Castillo and Velazquez, 2010). 
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The debate revolves around projections and expected impacts and opportunities as the sector 
in the region is at its first stages of development, but some evidence is now available. Table 
5.1 in Annexe 1 presents a short overview of the recent literature findings on the effects of 
biofuels production in SSA. No definitive conclusions can be drawn from this snapshot of case 
studies. Moreover, generalisations and stylised facts do not always match the facts on the 
ground. Bearing in mind these limitations, we can delineate some preliminary evidence on the 
local effects of the existing biofuel projects in SSA. For example, large-scale plantations, 
especially if they are based on large-scale land acquisitions, are usually problematic: in several 
cases there have been local objections, few or less than expected benefits and concerns about 
negative externalities and impacts. Projects based on small producers through cooperatives, 
groups of farms, outgrower farming schemes or other network system between smallholder 
farmers and biofuel processing or commercialising firms appear to offer more promising 
solutions, although they still have problems of economic competitiveness and viability.  
6.1 The current wave of land investments 
The debate on biofuel opportunities and risks is linked with the discussion on the current wave 
of large-scale land investments in several regions of the world. The expansion of agrifuel 
cultivation is seen as a driver of the so-called ‘land grabbing’ phenomenon. Before analysing 
the state of development of biofuel sector in SSA, we discuss the link between biofuel and land 
investments in the continent, the subject of heated debate. 
Land acquisition is not a new phenomenon: it dates back at least to colonial times. Over the 
last 50 years, however, land deals have risen substantially. This is particularly true in the last 
decade, when domestic and foreign investors have bought or leased land in developing 
countries. The debates on the number, characteristics and impacts of this trend have been 
particularly lively since 2009 (GRAIN, 2010; Cotula et al., 2009; Friis and Reenberg, 2011; 
Görgen et al., 2009; Smaller and Mann, 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Concrete 
Box 6.1 Types of biomass energy sources 
The term ‘biomass energy’ refers to fuelwood, crop residues, dung, and the solid, liquid and 
gaseous products derived from them. Biomass energy includes: 
Unprocessed sources: Fuelwood, agricultural and forestry residues, dung. 
Processed sources: Charcoal, biofuels (methanol/ethanol, biodiesel, etc), biogas (methane 
from manure), and gases (CO, H2, CH4) made from the destructive distillation of biomass.  
Biofuels fall into two categories:  
First-generation biofuels are biofuels made from sugar, starch, vegetable oil, or animal fats 
using conventional technology. Several by-products of commercial value are derived from 
the production of first-generation biofuels: animal feeds and products used in the food 
industry are obtained by grain-based ethanol and as by-products of biodiesel. Residuals 
from sugar cane ethanols are used in electricity production. 
Second-generation biofuels are produced in processes that can use a variety of non-food 
crops and cellulosic sources such as grasses and trees. They include waste biomass, the 
stalks of wheat, maize, wood, and special energy or biomass crops. More research is 
needed to understand their potential risks, but they usually perform better than first-
generation biofuels in terms of socio-environmental impacts: better carbon and energy 
balance, reduced competition for land-use changes and for food production. However, 
available technologies usually have higher costs of production and are less economically 
viable. Further technical and organisational advances are needed to make them 
competitive.  
Third-generation biofuels are at the research stage. They are derived from algae and they 
are expected to produce at higher yields and less water intensity than the previous 
generations of biofuels. 
Sources: Openshaw (2010); World Energy Council (2010a); Fonseca et al. (2010); Mitchell 
(2011) 
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information on the magnitude of the challenge, in terms of the amount and location of land 
concerned, on the state of the deals (concluded or planned), on the use of the land 
(agriculture, industry, tourism, mining etc) and on the players involved, is still very limited, 
often approximate and not always calculated with scientific rigour. (See Appendix 1 for details 
on land deals in SSA.) Data based on media reports reveal that an estimated 56 million ha 
might have been subject to recent deals in developing countries; in SSA the interest in land is 
estimated at 29 million ha (Deininger et al., 2011). 
While domestic investors tend to be elites, local entrepreneurs or the local government, foreign 
investors usually belong to two groups: (s) governments or state enterprises or state funds 
from oil-rich countries with little arable land, water scarcity and harsh climate conditions or (b) 
private companies from industrialised and emerging countries with large populations and rapid 
economic growth, investing mainly in agrifuel projects (von Braun and Meisen-Dick, 2009; 
Deininger et al., 2011). China and India are good examples of ‘new’ investors. The former 
mainly aim to improve food security and reduce the dependence on high and volatile food 
prices. The latter face an increasing demand for feed and renewable resources, which they try 
to address via FDI in land. This strategy helps them to reduce their dependence on world 
markets.24 
Drivers, not mutually exclusive and often interconnected, include: 
1. Increasing population and corresponding decline in the average amount of land per 
capita, combined with a very uneven distribution of population growth, of soil 
degradation, climate change impacts and land resources.25 Due to relative scarcity, the 
value of agricultural land is increasing. According to von Braun (2008) and Castel and 
Kamara (2009), in 2007 the price for agricultural land increased by about 16% in Brazil 
(where it is around US$5000–US$6000), 31% in Poland and 15% in the US Mid-West 
(where it is around US$7000). Sub-Saharan Africa has vast unexploited agricultural land 
and agricultural land prices in Africa are low and have not yet begun to increase (the 
estimated average price per hectare in Africa is between US$800–US$1000, according to 
Development Afrique (2009).26 Hence, buying land in SSA has become a very attractive 
investment. 
2. Increasing and shifting demand for food, feeds, and bio-fuel (fostered by fuel prices 
above historical levels and growing interest in green energy). Projections of the future 
demand for food suggest an increase of around 70% by 2050 (HLPE, 2011). Improved 
standards of living suggest an increase in the consumption of meat and dairy produce, 
for which more land will be required. According to Cotula et al. (2008), biofuel expansion 
is expected to increase demand to over 3% of arable land by 2030. 
3. Investments in governments’ quest to secure food in countries lacking enough land and 
water to feed their population. For instance, it has been argued that water is the hidden 
agenda behind many land acquisitions (Woodhouse and Ganho, 2011). The purchase (or 
lease) of land is de facto an investment in water since land comes with associated water 
rights and access. In other words, it seems to come ‘for free’ in the land-deal valuations. 
Furthermore, while there is scarce information on land deals, there is even less 
information on investments in water. The existing literature seldom estimates the water 
resources involved in land deals, their relative importance, or how they fit into water 
history or use. Yet the availability of water determines land productivity, especially for 
smallholder farming.  
4. Speculative investments and commodification of land. Since the 2008–2009 financial 
crisis, land has become an alternative way to invest capital in a moment of low and risky 
returns on financial assets. Higher prices for agricultural produce, such as those 
prevailing in 2008, may have pushed this trend. Moreover, the commercial value of land 
in SSA is still relatively low and has increased less than in other region, which fuels 
expectations of large increases in the future. The UK’s Agricultural Africa Land Fund, for 
instance, pays US$350–US$500 per ha in Zambia (about 10% of the cost of land in 
 
 
24
 A detailed description of the different players involved in large land deals is in CFS, HLPE, 2011: 16–17. 
25
 According to data reported in Friis and Reenberg (2011) the average amount of land per person has declined from 
around 7.9 ha in 1990 to around 2 ha in 2005 and the prediction for 2050 is approximately 1.6 ha. 
26
 See the table in the Appendix for a comparison of land prices. 
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Argentina or the USA). Many countries in SSA have large tracts of unexploited land, 
although in many cases land that is perceived as ‘empty’ and ‘idle’ is being used on the 
basis of informal rights.  
In summary, there are many reasons to invest in land and many land investments are 
targeting SSA on the grounds that the region has large unexploited agricultural potential 
(Deininger, 2011; Cotula et al., 2009). The process is leading to land concentration, the 
development of agricultural production and distribution systems, and labour relations oriented 
to the agri-business model, greater integration with urban and international markets, and 
restrictions on resource uses that are not formally recognised. The host governments are 
attempting to seize the opportunity represented by the rising value of land and water. They 
hope to promote economic development and reduce poverty by exchanging abundant 
resources (land) for scarce ones (capital, infrastructure, skills, technology). But things do not 
always work out like this and, if this wave of land acquisitions continues, the consequences 
could be profoundly negative, persistent and not easily reversible. The conditions within which 
the poverty-reducing effects of domestic and foreign investment in land can work are in fact 
very strict. Among others, the basic requirements include a clear definition and recognition of 
existing resource-use rights; the balanced, informed, competent and transparent engagement 
of all stakeholders; the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of participatory decision-
making processes; and of fair land deals and contract arrangements (ERD, 2009). These 
conditions seldom hold in developing countries, especially in SSA. This explains why a recent 
report of the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition commissioned by the 
UN Committee on World Food Security leaves no room for doubt about the negative impacts of 
ongoing large-scale land investments, concluding that ‘large scale investment is damaging the 
food security, incomes, livelihoods and environment for local people’ (HLPE, 2011: 8). Indeed, 
Deininger et al. (2011) find a positive correlation between large-scale land acquisitions and low 
recognition of land tenure. This implies that some developing countries, for instance those with 
weak institutions, tend to attract massive foreign capital in mining, land or in the so-called 
‘dirty’ manufacturing industries – which tend to be water-intensive and highly polluting – 
because of the lack of control and higher potential for corruption. Coming back to the potential 
role of the biofuel market in promoting economic and social development in SSA, we can 
conclude that biofuel investments are propelled by and have implications for the global, 
regional and local trends of land and water scarcity, entitlements and distribution. The 
promotion of this sector, therefore, should be evaluated in a more holistic perspective which 
takes into account the water-energy-land nexus and its meaning for water, food and energy 
security. 
6.2 The state of biofuel development 
Beyond its effects, what is the current state of biofuel development in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
Some main features can be identified: 
 Second-generation biofuels are marginal. The feedstocks most used in first-
generation biofuels are sugar cane and molasses to produce ethanol and jatropha 
to produce biodiesel or an oil than can fuel stationary power plants (Mitchell, 2011). 
But cassava, sweet sorghum and oil palm are also used. Mozambique, for instance, 
approved sugar cane, sweet sorghum, coconut and jatropha for biofuels production. 
In contrast, South Africa has classified jatropha as invasive species.  
 Available data (see Figure 6.1) suggest that so far Africa has lagged behind in the 
global biofuel market. In 2006, its ethanol production was estimated at 606 ML, or 
about 1% of global production. Excluding South Africa, SSA’s ethanol production, 
estimated at 189 ML, was lower than Colombia’s production alone (280 ML). Within 
the continent, South Africa accounted for the largest share of Africa’s ethanol 
market, producing 388 ML, but it appears that Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe are becoming relatively important ethanol producers.  
 In the biodiesel sector, SSA plays an even less significant role. Even if jatropha is 
widely cultivated, most countries have only just begun to promote this form of 
renewable energy. In southern Africa, where there are several small and medium-
scale producers, the biodiesel market is more developed. However, Africa’s first 
large-scale plant was inaugurated in 2007 in Zimbabwe but in 2009 was still 
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operating at less than 5% of capacity because of problems in the supply of raw 
materials. The first commercial biodiesel plant opened in Mozambique in 2007 and 
also encountered problems of feedstock supply (Amigun et al., 2011).  
Figure 6.1 World fuel ethanol production in 2006, million litres (ML) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Licht estimates reported in Renewable Fuels Association 
(2007) 
  Africa’s position in the biofuel market is expected to expand. Malawi, Mozambique 
and South Africa are among the pioneers of biofuel production, but cultivation of 
biofuel crops is expanding elsewhere (see Figure 6.2) and national plans have been 
promoted in Angola, Benin, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
(Amigun et al., 2011). General policy statements do not always translate into 
concrete legislative strategies (Richardson, 2010), but they nevertheless signal 
government commitment to promoting biofuel markets. Moreover, a growing 
number of investors are interested in the region. So, in some cases, are donors, 
government agencies or NGOs, which encourage integration of biofuel crops and 
food production to promote income diversification and to meet energy needs at 
household and community level. 
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Figure 6.2 Planned and executed biofuel investments in 22 SSA countries by ha of 
land accessed for estate cultivation and by origin of lead investor 
 
Source: Developed by the authors using CIFOR Global Biofuel Information Tool, using various 
reliable media, corporate and government sources and external publications. Accessed October 
2011. 
 Biofuel projects in Africa are very heterogeneous. Small farms of biofuel crops for 
local use have been promoted in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, 
Tanzania and Zambia (von Maltitz et al., 2009 and 2011; Diaz-Chavez et al., 2010). 
However, small-scale farmers are most commonly involved as outgrowers to supply 
large national and international producers of liquid biofuel blends. Often biofuel 
projects are large-scale commercial plantations financed by big corporations. 
Southern African countries, in particular, have attracted large-scale and mainly 
foreign investments in this sector, because of their comparative advantage, 
especially in sugar cane production, and their perceived land and fresh-water 
abundance (Richardson, 2011). Watson (2011), for instance, estimates that, in 
Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, 6 million ha are 
potentially suitable and available for sugar cane production, even excluding 
protected areas, closed canopy forests and wetlands, areas under food and/or cash 
crops, and areas with biophysical constraints. In Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra Leone large agrifuel plantations are planned or planted 
(von Maltitz et al. 2009; FoEE, 2010). 
 Trends in commercial farmland investment reveal the interest in Africa’s potential 
for biofuel production. Evidence based on information posted between October 
2008 and August 2009 on the blog of the NGO GRAIN (Deininger et al., 2011) 
indicates that about 25% of large-scale land investments in SSA, the region 
targeted for large-scale land acquisitions, are related to biofuel production. The 
same source shows that the continent attracted 48% of worldwide projects covering 
about two-thirds of the global targeted area (i.e. 39.7 million ha of a total of 56.6 
million ha). Information from the land transactions database on agrifuel projects 
suggest that the involvement of SSA in biofuel-related acquisitions of land might 
even greater.27 Data recorded in this inventory point out that biofuel production lies 
behind most of the land deals in Ethiopia, Madagascar and Mozambique (see Figure 
6.3), three of the top destinations for commercial land investment in SSA.  
 
 
27
 This inventory includes land deals which have been negotiated from 2000 in rural areas and that imply a 
transformation of land-use rights from communities and smallholders to commercial use (see 
http://www.commercialpressuresonland.org/monitoring-land-transactions). 
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Figure 6.3 Land deals in Ethiopia, Madagascar and Mozambique by nature of 
investment  
 
 
Source: Land transactions database, portal ‘Commercial Pressure on Land’, International Land 
Coalition, accessed 3 October 2011. 
 Foreign investments are a very important component of biofuel projects in SSA. 
Van Gelder and German (2011) find that foreign producers, companies and 
financiers control the sugar industry in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia and are 
dominant also in the oil-palm sector in Cameroon, the Congo and DRC. They 
conclude that: ‘Much of the feedstock and biofuel development in Africa depends on 
grants, (soft) loans and investments by foreign governments, foreign development 
banks and foreign state-owned companies’ (p.6). In Ghana, Schonevald et al. 
(2010) identify 17 biofuel companies of which 15 are foreign-owned and/or 
financed by the Ghanaian diaspora, and all but one have large-scale plantations. 
The OECD (notably European) countries are the main foreign investors in SSA (see 
Figure 6.2) but investors from non-OECD countries are increasing in importance, 
and South–South collaborations and joint ventures are expanding. According to 
data based on the CIFOR Global Biofuel Information Tool, foreign companies 
dominate land transactions for agrifuel projects in most countries, with the 
exception of Angola, Nigeria and Zimbabwe and, to a lower extent, Kenya and Mali 
(see Figure 6.2). OECD countries usually lead the trend, but non-OCED investors 
already control the largest share of the land for planned and executed biofuel 
investments in DRC, Gabon, Senegal and Uganda and also invest in many other 
countries. Investors from Brazil, China, India, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia account 
for a large share of agrifuel-related land deals in Ethiopia, while South African 
investors have negotiated significant land transactions in Mozambique (based on 
ILC Land Transaction Database). Dauvergne and Neville (2010) list a number of 
examples of South–South partnerships in other African countries: a Nigerian biofuel 
refinery developed a consortium with African, Philippine, Italian and Canadian 
partners. Malaysian and Chinese companies also have commercial interests in oil-
palm plantations in Liberia and in DRC, respectively. Richardson (2010) reports that 
Brazil, Angola and Mozambique signed cooperation agreements while a Brazilian 
and two Angolan companies have agreed on a US$210 million joint investment in 
Angola.  
  Despite these signs of acceleration in biofuel projects, the scaling up of biofuel 
production and its future trends are very uncertain, since investors’ expressions of 
interest do not always lead to the start-up of production, while the initial evidence 
of returns on biofuel investment in the continent is not very encouraging. 
Investment decisions in the SSA biofuel sector are still risky. In several cases, local 
resistance, financial problems, unexpected technical difficulties, uncertain market 
and regulatory conditions have represented barriers to the implementation of the 
projects. Based on case studies in DRC, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, 
Deininger et al. (2011) find that many large-scale land investments in this sector 
Number of deals Hectares 
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experienced financial problems and were cancelled after the 2008 oil boom. For 
instance, they report implementation difficulties in DRC and observe that in 
Mozambique, all the large biofuel projects they surveyed were delayed and none 
operated at full capacity. In Madagascar, riots and contestations against a 99-year 
lease of about 1.3 million ha to Daewoo brought down the government and led to 
the cancellation of the deal. Also van Gelder and German (2011) observe that in 
some countries, areas cultivated with biofuel feedstocks are much smaller than the 
areas acquired by investors. Another study finds that it is not economically viable 
for Kenyan small farmers to sell jatropha seeds to commercial processors (GTZ 
2009a, cited in Hunsberger, 2010). Some case studies of companies with 
operations in Africa suggest that building capacity in proper planting, caring and 
processing takes time and is essential to the performance of jatropha. Moreover, 
the long delay between project proposal, investment, and production as well as the 
decline in energy prices, created financial difficulties (Mitchell, 2011). Friends of the 
Earth Europe (FoEE, 2010) reports that in Mozambique and Swaziland small 
farmers who started to cultivate crops for agrifuel feedstock, in many cases under 
outgrowing schemes with large (mainly European) companies, claim low yields, 
processing difficulties, problems with pests and in accessing inputs (water, seeds, 
pesticides). These barriers to the expansion of biofuel production are reflected in 
the lack of data on investment trends in the sector. Van Gelder and German (2011) 
estimate that the ten largest companies invested about US$5.7–US$6.7 billion to 
produce biofuels between 2000 and 2009 in a group of 20 countries, but sugar-
based ethanol production in Brazil, capturing investments worth some US$3.8–
US$4.2 billion, accounted for most of the volume together with Colombia, Indonesia 
and Malaysia. In contrast, investments in nine forest-rich African countries with 
significant biofuel activities were small or negligible. 
 In line with the dominance of foreign investors and barriers to biofuel productions, 
current evidence suggests that in several African countries most biofuel crops are 
exported (Franco, 2010; van Gelder and German, 2011), which implies that the 
main value-added will be captured externally.  
6.3 The way forward 
Our analysis shows that the SSA biofuel sector is growing but is at a very preliminary stage of 
development and several barriers hinder its expansion and its pro-poor potential. Now is the 
time to introduce corrective measures to ensure that Africa will benefit from the growth in 
biofuel production. If existing incentives to biofuel development continue to drive large-scale 
land acquisitions and land-use conversion from food to biofuel crops, the risks pose serious 
concerns – and are also irreversible. Governments that have chosen to promote the agrifuel 
sector, making land available to big investors and focusing exclusively on large-scale deals, 
have so far reaped little success. Expected and documented impacts of large land acquisitions 
in SSA cast doubts on the pro-development role of biofuel investments under such conditions. 
In theory, investment in land could be positive for host countries as long as rules are followed 
and employment created, but with the current governance structure it is likely that the risks 
outweigh the benefits. Host countries often lack adequate regulation to protect their 
populations. Land tenure is complicated, land rights are not recognised, local farmers can be 
displaced and not even compensated for their loss. Incentives for the elites and government to 
protect public goods rather than private interests are low and often lack credibility. In these 
circumstances, investments in land are likely to worsen local food security, increasing the risks 
of conflicts and social tensions as well as undermining access to water.  
Moreover, biofuel development is controversial even when it is not accompanied by large-scale 
land acquisitions. The ‘biofuel is good’ and ‘biofuel is bad’ hypotheses usually mask widely 
diverging views, and behind this debate lies the dilemma on the role of agribusiness: does it 
exacerbate exclusion and poverty of small farmers or does it help to connect them with global 
markets or offer new labour opportunities? These issues are beyond the scope of this paper, 
other than to note that simplistic narratives can be misleading and that the role of pro-
developmental state institutions appears to be essential in fostering virtuous collaborations and 
synergies between agribusiness and smallholders. Moreover, the evidence presented in this 
paper suggests that a strategy for biofuel development which pivots on small farmers and on 
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small-scale contractors might have greater chances of success than large-plantation farming 
systems.  
In addition, the issue of the possible pressure on other human and productive uses of water 
and soil resources remains open, while the role of biofuels in mitigating GhG emissions is 
questionable. These indirect effects on biofuel development are also shaped by the choice of 
feedstock and the type of land use. Second-generation biofuels, for instance, generally require 
less fertiliser and produce less CO2 emissions (Delucchi, 2010) than first-generation crops. 
They may also have less impact on food production since they can be produced from crops that 
grow on poor land and from waste products (Fonseca et al., 2010). Second- and third-
generation biofuels seem, therefore, to offer more promising perspectives in terms of social 
and environmental sustainability, but so far they are not economically competitive (Mitchell, 
2011; Fairley, 2011).  
Promoting energy from residues and waste rather than energy crops, and financing more 
research and investment in advanced biofuels, are therefore a priority for ensuring the 
economic, environmental and social sustainability of the large-scale deployment of biofuels.
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7 Concluding remarks 
This paper has tried to delineate the current global trends, drivers and features of investment 
in renewable energy with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. It has also delved into the state of 
development of biofuels, a sector which exemplifies the close links between food, energy and 
water security, with specific attention to some of the challenges posed by water and land 
scarcities and their complex interconnections28 and on differences between domestic and 
foreign investments.  
First, our analysis argues that the current structure of global energy market, demand and use 
is largely unfair, unsustainable and, as shown by the recent peaks in energy, commodity and 
food prices, increasingly fragile. Reduced energy demand, especially in the richest and 
emerging countries, is the essential condition for equitable and sustainable economic 
development at the global level. The focus on energy policy mandates, which are formulated in 
relative terms, risks diverting international attention from absolute targets and from the 
priority to reduce energy demand and to promote dematerialisation of both production and 
consumption – especially in advanced countries, which account for a disproportionate share of 
global energy and material uses.  
We have shown that large-scale deployment of renewable energy can make an important 
contribution to the struggle against energy, financial and non-financial poverty as well as 
against environmental degradation and climate change.  
Available evidence suggests that, at the global level, renewable energy is gaining ground on 
fossil fuels and investment in this sector is growing at spectacular rates, but renewables 
remain marginal to world energy consumption. Moreover, the renewable energy market and 
the growth in investment tend to be concentrated in a small group of countries. Despite its 
great technical potential, Africa lags behind in terms of access to energy and deployment of 
modern renewable energy technologies. Renewable energy could be important in reducing 
energy poverty and in helping Africa to meet its future energy needs, but there is a need to 
mobilise financial resources, policy support, research efforts, and to improve governance.  
Bridging the financing gap is a first step. Bazilian et al. (2011), for example, estimate that, 
even if all energy-related investment were used to increase access to energy, most LDCs29 
would not achieve universal household electrification by 2030: on average, the yearly 
investment needed to attain this goal is five times greater than current energy-related financial 
flows. Bridging the financing gap also means mobilising private resources and reducing 
premium risks of investment in renewable energy, which requires, among other conditions, a 
stable and favourable regulatory and policy framework.  
The financing gap is only one of the obstacles to investment in renewable energy. We have 
identified and discussed a range of institutional, market and technological barriers that set 
back the large-scale development of and investment in renewable energy both in high- and 
low-income countries. More and better government policies, international initiatives, 
multilateral agreements and development assistance are needed to remove or reduce these 
obstacles. Policy options include (a) initial subsidies (feed-in tariffs, output and investment 
subsidies) which can be removed after the consolidation of the renewable energy sector; (b) 
phasing out of fossil-fuel subsidies and promotion of a pricing system which reflects 
externalities of energy production and use; (3) public investments and institutional 
arrangements for creating hybrid and flexible energy networks in order to facilitate integration 
of renewable energy in the current energy system and the entry of new and independent 
 
 
28 While there are some scattered data on the size of land acquisitions, and preliminary surveys on the use of the 
acquired land (see also Table A3), to our knowledge there is no study on the amount of water resources involved nor 
their relative importance with respect to other economic activities. According to World Bank (2007), for instance, 
agriculture is responsible for 70% (85% for developing countries) of global freshwater withdrawals, much of it for 
irrigation (although in Africa irrigation covers only 4% of agricultural land). When investing in land, water comes ‘for 
free’. But water is (and has historically been) a source of conflict, which is likely to be exacerbated by the current 
trend of land acquisitions and biofuels production.   
29 Note that 33 of the 48 LDCs are in Africa. 
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energy producers; (d) financing and supporting research initiatives for development of 
appropriate technologies to local contexts and for reducing production, social and 
environmental costs of renewable energy. In addition, information campaigns and other 
systems of sharing information can help to heighten the awareness of consumers, policy-
makers and investors of the potential benefits, applications, and technical and economic 
feasibility of renewable energy technologies. Finally, in LICs and MICs there is a need for 
specific political commitment to combat energy poverty as a basis for ensuring that higher 
energy production translates into better access to clean and affordable energy for the poor.  
The choice of energy carriers is also crucial. Biofuels, in particular, represent (together with 
hydropower) one of the most debated forms of renewable energy. Even if we anticipate 
important developments, for the foreseeable future the transport sector will continue to rely on 
liquid fuels. Sub-Saharan Africa is still a marginal player in the biofuels market, but its role is 
growing. Southern Africa has been described as a potential ‘Middle East of biofuels’30 and FDI 
in land acquisitions for biofuel projects is concentrated in certain African countries. We have 
seen that the risks and opportunities of biofuel production and use are particularly relevant for 
SSA as the continent simultaneously faces energy poverty, high vulnerability to climate 
change, widespread poverty, low rates of growth in agricultural productivity, food insecurity 
and water stress and scarcity. Biofuels can help African populations to meet their current and 
increasing energy needs, and to develop alternative, sustainable and profitable income sources 
in the agricultural sector, but this will be possible only if the conditions to reap the benefits are 
met in advance or in conjunction with investment projects. These conditions include (a) clear 
definition and recognition of existing resource-use rights; (b) balanced, informed, comptent 
and transparent engagement of all stakeholders; (c) knowledge and technology transfer to 
local communities; (d) careful assessment of indirect land-use change and water intensity and 
requirements; (e) implementation of rules and actions to facilitate the use of biofuel production 
to provide local energy. The prevailing government approach, both in the main consumer and 
producer countries, which is centred on policy mandates, targets and subsidies, should be 
reconsidered as it either produces or does not prevent unwanted side-effects.  
Finally, we have highlighted the main differences between domestic and foreign direct 
investments. These are particularly important for land (and therefore also for renewable 
energies, which need land). Domestic investors tend to acquire smaller areas of land than 
foreign investors, which are likely to have more capital.31 Furthermore, domestic investors 
tend to consult more with the local communities before deciding whether and how to use the 
land while foreign investors tend to exploit possible economies of scale.  
Last but not least we broach the issue of links between investment and the quality of 
institutions. Further work is needed in this area. However, we suggest that while in general 
good institutions are conducive to investments, a large literature highlights that some specific 
types of investment seem to obey different rules. Investment in land is one such example, as 
also emphasised by Deininger (2011). Investments in so-called ‘dirty industries’, i.e. 
manufacturing industries which are water-intensive and polluting, are another example. It 
seems that such investments tend to be made in countries where rules are less stringent and 
easier to break, a tendency that becomes more marked as regulations in developed countries 
become tighter. This has obvious implications for the impact of investments on development 
and for the possibility of local populations to reap the benefits of investments in land, water 
and renewable energies. 
 
 
30
 Andrew Owens, CEO of Greenergy at Biofuels Markets Africa Conference, Cape Town, 30 November–1 December 
2006.  
31
 According to the Norwegian’s People Aid (2011) study on Sudan, for instance, domestic investors’ average size of 
land is around 9000 ha, while foreign investors is around 175,000 ha. Other studies confirm the differences for other 
countries. 
Sub-Saharan Africa in global trends of investment in renewable energy. Drivers and the challenge of the water-energy-land nexus 
42 
 
Appendix 1 – Land deals in SSA: a look at the data 
Land deals occur within and between regions, and South–South deals are increasingly 
common: China is one of the main investors in land in SSA.32 In general, domestic investors 
are elites, local entrepreneurs or the local government, while foreign investors are either (a) 
governments or state enterprises or state funds from oil-rich countries or (b) private 
companies from industrialised and emerging countries, investing mainly in agrifuel projects 
(see von Braun and Meisen-Dick, 2009; Deininger et al., 2011).33 If the large number of 
domestic investors raises some concerns, since large domestic acquisitions are likely to exert a 
negative effect on land distribution, foreign acquisitions pose far greater concerns, especially 
the possible loss of countries’ or communities’ control over land. Furthermore, foreign land 
deals are often not followed up with productive investments: according to Deininger et al. 
(2011) only 20% of announced investments have led to agricultural production. 
Information on existing deals is at best scattered, approximate and incomplete. Most 
information is derived from (sometimes unreliable) media reports, or case studies that may 
not have been carried out in a rigorous manner.34 Furthermore, existing reports have very 
different coverage: some exclude allocations below 10 ha, some include deals still under 
negotiation, and often there is no clear-cut distinction between land that is leased or bought, 
nor whether the investor is domestic or foreign.  
A starting point for understanding the size of the phenomenon is that only 3 billion ha out of 
the world total land surface of 13 billion ha is suitable for agriculture and only 50% of this 
arable land is currently cultivated (Deininger, 2011). Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by 
heterogeneity in terms of land availability as well as land rights and the quality of institutions. 
For instance Rwanda and Malawi are land-scarce (Deininger, 2011) while DRC, Tanzania and 
Zambia among others are land-abundant. 
Figure A1 Percentage of arable land by country and years 
 
Source: FAO stat accessed August 30 2011 
 
 
32
 Land acquisition typically involves leases of periods up to 99 years and often in excess of 10,000 ha. The main actor 
is the private sector, both domestic and foreign: agribusiness, banks, commodity traders, hedge funds (see for 
instance Friis and Reenberg, 2011). However, in the past few years, states and sovereign funds have begun to play an 
increasingly important role. Depending on who is on the ‘other side of the deal’, this can create important asymmetries 
with policy implications. A detailed analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. Discussions can be found 
in Friis and Reenberg (2011) as well as in the GRAIN and ILC blogs. 
33
 For a detailed description of the different players involved in large land deals see CFS, HLPE 2011, pp. 16–17. 
34
 A recent project ‘monitoring land transactions’ jointly carried out by GIZ, Oxfam International and various research 
institutes is trying to create a database. 
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Tanzania has well defined land rights while DRC does not. A first look at the data seems to 
suggest that the negative correlation between the quality of institutions and the number of 
deals. Tanzania, for instance, transferred only 50 000 ha to foreign investors between 2004 
and 2009, while more fragile countries with weak institutions gave away much more. Existing 
estimates indicate transfer of 2.7 million ha in Mozambique, 5 million ha in Sudan, 1.6 million 
ha in Liberia and 1.2 million ha in Ethiopia. Ethiopia, Madagascar and Sudan have the largest 
number of individual land deals (see Table A1).  
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Table A1 Land deals by country, a comparison of different sources of information (in ha) 
Country 
Deininger 
et al. 
(2011) GTZ 
Cotula et al. 
(2009) 
Office of 
Niger (2009) 
Gorgen et 
al. 
Oaklan
d 
Inst. 
(2011) 
Schone
verd 
(2010) 
Commercial 
Land 
Pressure 
webL 
Global Land Project 
web (and Friis and 
Reenberg, 2010) 
Land deal Brief, 
June (2011) 
Period 
covered   Up to 2009 2004–2009 
 Up to 2009   Up to 2010 
(2008 onwards) 
 
Angola        25000 140,000  
Kenya        40000   
Ethiopia 1,190,000  602,760 
    13,000- 
18,000 2,892,000-354,000 
 
Madagascar  1,720,300 803,414  1,720,300   502,000 2,745,000  
Sudan 3,965,000  471,660 
    1,297,000 3,171000-
4,899,000 
 
South Sudan    
     
 
600,000 (plus 
400,000) 
Cameroon        10,000 1,0000  
Tanzania    
     45,000 1,717,000-
11,000,000 
 
Mali  159,505 162,850 
242,577 159,505   100,000 2,417,000-
2,419,000 
 
Mozambique 2,670,000        10,305,000  
Uganda    
     1,874,000-
1,904,000 
 
DRC        2,800,000 1,1048,000  
Nigeria        10,000 821,000  
Zambia         2,245,000  
Ghana   452,000    107,500 452,000 89,000  
Malawi         307,000  
Sierra Leone      500,000      
Senegal         510,000  
Zimbabwe        101,000   
Liberia 1,602,000       17,000   
TOTAL  2.5 millions         
 
Sources: Deininger et al. (2011); GTZ (2009b); Cotula et al. (2009); The Oakland Institute (2011); Gorgen et al. (2009); Schoneverd (2010); 
Commercial Land Pressure web site, Land deal Brief, June 2011; von Braun and Meisen-Dick (2009); Friis and Reenberg (2010). 
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Some additional useful information can be extracted by noting that there are a number of 
cancelled deals and the status of many is unknown (Table A2). 
Table A2 Unsigned, pending and cancelled land deals 
Country Planned/under discussion/status unknown Disrupted 
Congo Rep 8,000,000  
Ethiopia 602,760  
Madascar 1,500,000 1,300,000 
Mali 62,850  
Mozambique 10,000 Value US$800 million 
Sudan 378,000  
Tanzania 505,500  
Zambia 2,200,000  
Source: Odhiambo (2011, table 1) 
As mentioned earlier, land deals, especially foreign investments, are often not followed up with 
productive investments. When they are, they tend to be used: (a) to produce biofuels such as 
jatropha and sugar for ethanol (the ‘new Middle East of biofuels’); (b) for mining platinum or 
uranium; (c) for timber (indigenous forest clearance, some plantations); (d) for tourism: 
enclosures for safaris or sea resorts, exclusion of fishing communities.  
Table A3 summarises, for countries for which information is available, our best estimate of 
where investments in land have been targeted. The sources are different. In some cases, 
information is confined to the fact that some investment was in mining or tourism but without 
any reference to the number of projects. The only study providing such numbers is Odhiambo 
(2011) (but only some countries are scrutinised and the study is not exhaustive). 
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Table A3 Purposes of land deals, by country 
Country 
Food  
production Biofuels 
Industrial 
 
productio
n 
Minin
g 
Touris
m 
Hydroelect
ric 
Forest
ry 
Wat
er 
stres
s 
Angola * *  *  *   
Benin  *       
Botswana *        
Cameroon *       9.5 
Congo Republic * *      16.0 
Cote d’Ivoire * *       
Djibouti *        
DRC * *      10.0 
Eritrea *        
Ethiopia x xxx *     3.5 
Ghana * *       
Kenya xx       2.0 
Liberia *       13.0 
Madascar x xxx *     10.0 
Malawi * *  *     
Mali  *      7.5 
Mauritius  *       
Mozambique  *  * * * * 8.0 
Namibia         
Niger *        
Nigeria * *       
Senegal * *       
Sierra Leone * *       
Somalia *        
South Africa *   *     
South Sudan        n/a 
Sudan xxx x   x   3.5 
Swaziland * *       
Tanzania * *  *    5.0 
Uganda  *      5.0 
Zambia * *      7.5 
Zimbabwe * *  *     
Estimated 
Percentage 
 
50% (Cotula, 
2011) 
37% (GRAIN 
web) 
 
40%(Cotula, 
2011) 
35% (GRAIN, 
web)      
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on: Friis and Reenberg (2011); Land deal Brief, June 
(2011); The Oakland Institute (2011); Odhiambo (2011); GTZb, 2009; Von Braun and Meisen-
Dick (2009); Cotula et al. (2009). 
Notes: ‘x’ if the number is known and is between 1 and 5 projects, ‘xx’ if the number is 
between 5 and 10, ‘xxx’ if it is above 10 and ‘*’if the number is not known but there is 
information on the existence of at least one project. Water Stress is from ODDO (2010). 
Current estimates suggest that, on average (with large heterogeneity), between 35% and 50% 
of the land is used for food production and around 35%–40% is used for biofuels (see Table 
A3), but they also suggest that the biofuel share is increasing. Much less land is being used for 
other purposes. Information on land deals used for tourism is incomplete, but in some cases, 
such as Sudan, the area involved is very large, which makes the sector seem more active than 
it really is.  
The impact on development of each use is likely to be different as is the impact of investments 
in different sectors. There is need for further analysis and more detailed data in order to 
assess such impacts. Given the importance of institutions, the impact is also likely to be very 
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country-specific. A reasonable guess is that, in line with the literature reported above, 
investments in land aimed at a supply chain in food production (manufacturing) are likely to 
have a higher positive impact and create more spillover with domestic investments than 
biofuels. However, most projects seem to be (see Table A3) focused on intensive farming and 
do not take into account the environmental considerations nor seek to create a balance 
between organic and intensive agriculture. Hence, they could have perverse effects. 
Table A4 Value of land in selected countries 
Value of land per ha Countries 
Less than US$100 Bhutan, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guyana, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Niger, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam  
US$ 100–200 Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi Nigeria, Somalia, Zambia 
US$ 201–300 Bangladesh, Benin, Central African Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Haiti, 
Jordan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Rwanda  
US$ 301–500 Algeria, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Guinea, Lesotho, Togo, 
Zimbabwe 
US$ 501–1,000 Angola, Bolivia, Cameroon, Congo, Djibouti, Oman, Senegal, Swaziland  
US$ 1,001–2,000 Albania, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Iran, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Moldova, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Romania, Tunisia 
US$ 2,001–3,000 Botswana, Costa Rica, Namibia, Venezuela 
US$ 3,001–5,000 Mauritius, Reunion, Uruguay 
US$ 5,001–10,000 Argentina, Cyprus, Gabon, Greece, Israel, Korea, Malta, Portugal, UAE 
US$ 10,001–15,000 Australia, Canada 
US$ 15,001–20,000 Belgium, Norway, Spain, UK 
US$ 20,001–30,000 Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, USA 
Greater than US$ 30,000 Denmark, Luxemburg, Japan 
Source: authors elaboration on http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x8423e/x8423e10.htm#P1851 
and http://news.mongabay.com/bioenergy/2006/09/land-prices-in-africa.html. Note that some 
data refer to the late1990s. 
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Table A5 Evidence of impacts of biofuel and biogas projects in sub-Saharan Africa 
Issues Source Area/Scale  Countries Evidence 
Competing land and water 
uses; employment 
opportunities 
Franco (2010)  
 
Large-scale project 
involving 30,000 ha  
Mozambique Diversion of arable land, water resources and other public 
resources from food production. 
In 2007, conflicts about the resettlement of local communities to 
set up a sugarcane ethanol plantation on 30,000 ha in Gaza 
province.  
Few jobs created or sustained. 
Land deals  Vermeulen and 
Cotula (2010)  
Large land deals Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Mali, Madagascar, 
Mozambique and 
Tanzania 
Local people’s capacity to bargain or give free consent to 
investments is limited by their lack of access to economic and 
institutional alternatives.  
In negotiations, government agencies tend to align with the 
interests of large-scale investors. 
Competing land and water 
uses; environmental 
pressure; economic and 
political viability of the 
projects 
Deininger et al. 
(2011) 
Nhantumbo and 
Salomão (2010) 
Large-scale project: 
concession of use rights 
on 30,000 ha to an MNC 
to produce sugar cane 
for ethanol (project 
cancelled) 
Mozambique Local people lost access to forest for fuelwood, game meat, fish 
and reduced access to water.  
Biofuels projects exacerbate competition for land, water and other 
resources.  
Low enforcement of legislation and agreements between investors 
and communities, no genuine community consultation.  
Competing land and water 
uses; environmental 
pressure; land deals 
Sulle and Nelson 
(2009) 
Large-scale biofuel 
investments (22,000 in 
process of being 
acquired and 8,211 
already acquired) 
Tanzania Negative impacts on access to forest and community-based 
natural resources or livestock grazing. Inadequate compensation 
to local communities. 
Generation of income 
sources and employment 
opportunities, land access 
Sulle and Nelson 
(2009) 
Hybrid model (FELISA) 
which combines large 
plantations and contract 
farming. It involves 
about 5,000 ha.  
Tanzania Low impact on land access. 
Potential positive impacts on employment and agricultural 
production opportunities.  
Competing land and water 
uses; employment 
opportunities 
Deininger et al. 
(2011) 
Large-scale project on 
20,000 ha 
Mozambique Negative effects on grazing and fertile land and forest community 
rights.  
Few jobs created or sustained 
Food security, economic 
viability of the projects  
Diaz-Chavez et al. 
(2010) 
Five small jatropha 
producer projects and 
venture (Mali 
Folkecentre’s Garalo 
project, Mali 
Biocarburant SA, the 
Jatropha Mali Initiative, 
and GERES) 
Mali In one project, water access was identified as one of the main 
barriers for planting jatropha. Also access to inputs is an obstacle.  
The demand for jatropha grains greatly surpasses the supply.  
Ethanol produced is consumed in Mali and Burkina Faso.  
Jatropha programmes have not compromised food production at 
local level 
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Environmental risks and 
opportunities 
Romijn (2011) Unspecified Angola, Tanzania, 
Zambia, 
Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe 
Jatropha can help sequester atmospheric carbon when grown on 
complete wastelands and in severely degraded conditions. 
Conversely, when introduced in tropical woodlands with 
substantial biomass and medium/ high organic soil carbon 
content, jatropha creates significant emissions that offset any GhG 
savings from the rest of the biofuel production chain.  
Energy security, 
macroeconomic impacts 
Franco (2010) Uspecified Mozambique Biofuels are largely for export to EU countries and South Africa. 
Economic viability of the 
projects 
GTZ (2009) cited 
in Hunsberger 
(2010) 
Small-scale farming Kenya It is not economically viable for Kenyan small farmers to sell 
jatropha seeds to commercial processors. 
Macroeconomic impacts on 
poverty and economic 
growth 
Arndt et al. (2009) Large-scale projects Mozambique This study estimates the impact of large-scale biofuel investments 
in Mozambique on economic growth and income distribution using 
a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. It found 
that biofuels investment can promote economic growth and 
reduce poverty with potential for strong gains. 
Generation of income, 
environmental impacts, 
food security 
Mitchell (2011)  
 
5,000 small outgrowers 
who work for Diligent 
company and have 
planted 3,500 ha 
Tanzania Case study on a outgrowing farming scheme which involves 5,000 
smallholders who produce jatropha seeds for sale to a Dutch 
company (Diligent). The model ensures a high degree of social 
and ecological sustainability. Farmers share significantly in the 
value chain and their jatropha hedges do not limit other farming 
activities. The sale of jatropha seeds provides extra income. There 
is no impact on deforestation.   
Generation of income, 
competition for land 
Sulle and Nelson 
(2009) 
5,000 small outgrowers 
who work for Diligent 
company and have 
planted 3,500 ha (see 
above) 
Tanzania No direct negative impacts on local land access, agricultural 
diversification through jatropha cultivation 
Generation of income, 
environmental impacts, 
food security, access to 
energy 
Practical Action 
Consulting (2009) 
Cooperative of c300 
jatropha producers. 600 
ha are under cultivation 
on land previously used 
to grow cotton.  
Mali Within the Garalo Project, small-scale farmers supply jatropha oil 
to a private power company that provide electricity to local 
consumers. 
The project provides a stable income to farmers and access to 
electricity for the community, both having stimulated the local 
economy. 
Generation of income, 
access to energy, 
environmental risks  
Practical Action 
Consulting (2009) 
4,500 ha under 
cultivation; 
smallholder and out-
grower farming 
 
Tanzania A sisal growing and processing company (Katani Ltd) uses sisal 
waste to produce biogas and to convert it into electricity (currently 
150 kwh).This has increased farmers’ income and community 
access to electricity with positive effects on local economy, public 
services, access to education, communication and healthcare 
services. 
Access to electricity for cooking reduces the pressure on forest 
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resources. 
Environmental pressure, 
land competition and 
compensation  
Schoneveld et al. 
(2010) 
Large-scale plantations Ghana Opaque and non-participatory negotiations. Inadequate 
compensations. Community land losses and evictions. 
Diversion of lands from food production. People who lost 
their lands have shortened fallow period on the remaining 
plots and have lost income, suffer increased food insecurity, 
and lost access to vital forest products 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa in global trends of investment in renewable energy. Drivers and the challenge of the water-energy-land nexus 
51 
References 
African Development Bank (2010) Financing of Sustainable Energy Solutions, African Development Bank. 
Alfaro, L., Chanda, A., Kalemli-Ozcan, S. and Sayek, S. (2004) ‘FDI and economic growth: the role of local financial 
markets’, Journal of International Economics 64(1): 89–112. 
Alguacil, M., Cuadros, A. and Orts, V. (2011) ‘Inward FDI and growth: the role of macroeconomic and institutional 
environment’, Journal of Policy Modeling 33(3): 481–496. 
Allen, F. and Giovannetti, G. (2011) ‘The effects of the financial crisis on sub-Saharan Africa’, Journal of Development 
Finance 1:1–28. 
Amigun, B., Musangob, J.K. and Stafford, W. (2011) ‘Biofuels and sustainability in Africa’, Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 15:1360–1372.  
Anyanwu J. (2011) ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Africa, 1980–2007’, Working Paper No. 136, 
Tunis: African Development Bank. 
Asiedu, E. (2001) ‘On the determinants of foreign direct investment to developing countries: is Africa different?’, World 
Development 30(1): 107–119.  
Aykut, D., and Sayek, S. (2007) ‘The role of the sectoral composition of foreign direct investment on growth’, in L. 
Piscitello and G. Santangelo (eds) Do multinationals feed local development and growth?, Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Bailis, R., Cowan, A., Berrueta, V., and Masera, O. (2009) ‘Arresting the killer in the kitchen: the promises and pitfalls 
of commercializing improved cookstoves’, World Development 37(10): 1694-1705. 
Balasubramanyam, V. N., Salisu, M. and Sapsford, D. (1996) ‘Foreign direct investment and growth in EP and IS 
Countries’, Economic Journal 106: 92–105. 
Bazilian, M., Nussbaumer, P., Haites, E., Levi, M., Howells, M. and Yumkella, K. (2010) ‘Understanding the scale of 
investments for universal energy access’, Geopolitics of Energy 32(10-11): 21–42. 
Bazilian, M, Rogner, H., Howells, M., Hermann, S., Arent, D., Gielen, D., Steduto, P., Mueller, A., Komor, P., Tol, 
R.S.J., and Yumkella, K.K. (2011) ‘Considering the energy, water and food nexus: towards an integrated modelling 
approach’, Energy Policy, in press. 
Bazilian, M., Gualberti, G., Haites, E., Levi, M., Siegel, J., Kammenf, D.M., and Joergen, F. (2011) ‘Informing the 
Financing of Universal Energy Access: An Assessment of Current Flows’, FEEM Working Paper No. 56.2011, Milan: 
FEEM.  
Beck, T., Maimbo, S., Faye, I. and Triki T. (2011) Financing Africa through the crisis and beyond, Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Berndes, G. (2002) ‘Bio-energy and water-the implications of large-scale bio-energy production for water use and 
supply’, Global Environmental Change 12: 253–271. 
Blomstrom, M., Lipsey, R. E. and Zejan, M. (1994) ‘What explains developing country growth’, NBER Working Paper 
No. 4132, Cambridge, MA: NBER. 
BNEF (2011) Bloomberg New Energy Finance Summit: Results Book 2011, 4–7 April, New York: BNEF. 
Bonassi, C., Giovannetti, G. and Ricchiuti, G. (2006) ‘The Effects of FDI on Growth and Inequality’, in G. A.Cornia (ed.) 
Pro Poor Macroeconomics – Potential and Limitations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Borensztein, E., De Gregorio, J. and Lee, J. W. (1998) ‘How does foreign direct investment affect economic growth?’, 
Journal of International Economics 45: 115–135. 
Brambila-Macias, J. and Massa, I. (2010) ‘The global financial crisis and sub-Saharan Africa: the effects of slowing 
private capital inflows on growth’, African Development Review 22: 366–377. 
Briceño-Garmendia, C., Smits, K., and Foster, V. (2008) ‘Financing Public Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Patterns, Issues, and Options’, AICD Background Paper 15, Africa Infrastructure Sector Diagnostic, Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
CAPRi-UNDP (2011) ‘Land Rights for African Development From Knowledge to Action’, CAPRi Policy Brief, Washington, 
DC: IFPRI. 
Castel V. and Kamara, A. (2009) ‘Foreign Investments in Africa’s Agricultural Land: Implications for Rural Sector 
Development and Poverty Reduction’, African Development Bank Development Research Brief, no. 2, Office of the 
Chief Economist, Tunis: AfDB. 
Chakraborty, C., and Nunnenkamp, P. (2008) ‘Economic reforms, FDI, and economic growth in India: a sector level 
analysis’, World Development 36(7):1192–1212. 
Cotula, L., Dyer, N., and Vermeulen, S. (2008) Fuelling Exclusion? The Biofuels Boom and Poor People’s Access To 
Land, London: IIED.  
Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R. and Keeley, J. (2009) Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural 
investment and international land deals in Africa, London & Rome: IIED, FAO & IFAD. 
Sub-Saharan Africa in global trends of investment in renewable energy. Drivers and the challenge of the water-energy-land nexus 
52 
 
Daniel, S. and Mittal, A. (2009) The great land grab. Rush for world’s farmland threatens food security for the poor, 
Oakland, CA: The Oakland Institute. 
Daniel, S. and Mittal, A. (2010) (Mis)Investment in agriculture. The role of the international finance corporation in 
global land grabs, Oakland, CA: The Oakland Institute. 
Dauvergne, P. and Neville, K.J. (2010) ‘Forests, food, and fuel in the tropics: the uneven social and ecological 
consequences of the emerging political economy of biofuels’, Journal of Peasant Studies 37(4): 631–60. 
De Fraiture, C., Giordano, M. and Liao, Y.S. (2008) ‘Biofuels and implications for agricultural water use: blue impacts 
of green energy’, Water Policy 10: 67–81. 
Delucchi, A.M. (2010) ‘Impacts of biofuels on climate change, water use, and land use’, Annals of the New York 
Academy of Science 1195: 28–45. 
Deichmann, U., Meisner, C., Murray, S. and Wheeler, D. (2011) ‘The economics of renewable energy expansion in 
rural Sub-Saharan Africa’, Energy Policy 39: 215–227. 
Deininger, K. (2011) ‘Challenges posed by the new wave of farmland investments’, Journal of Peasant Studies 38: 
217–247. 
Deininger, K., Byerlee, D., Lindsay, J., Norton, A., Selod, H. and M, Stickler (2011) Rising Global Interest in Farmland: 
Can it Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Development Afrique (2009) ‘Foreign Investment in African Agriculture: New Land Grab or Opportunity?’ October, 
available at: http://developmentafrique.com/?p=75. 
Diaz-Chavez, R., Mutimba, S., Watson, H., Rodriguez-Sanchez, S. and M. Nguer (2010) ‘Mapping Food and Bioenergy 
in Africa: A Report Prepared for FARA. Accra, Ghana. 
Doythc, N., and Uctum, M. (2011) ‘Does the worldwide shift of FDI from manufacturing to services accelerate 
economic growth? A GMM estimation study’, Journal of International Money and Finance 30: 410–427. 
Ecofys NL – REN21 ( 2008) ‘Global Potential of Renewable Energy Sources: A Literature Assessment’, available at: 
http://www.ren21.net/.  
Egger, P. and Winner, H. (2005) ‘Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment’, European 
Journal of Political Economy 21(1): 932–952.  
EIA – US Energy Information Administration (2010) International Energy Outlook 2010, Washington, DC: US 
Department of Energy. 
Eregha, P.B. (2011) ‘The Dynamic Linkages Between Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Investment in ECOWAS 
Countries: A Panel Cointegration Analysis’, paper presented at the CSAE Conference, University of Oxford, 20–22 
March. 
Ernst & Young (2011) It’s Time for Africa: Ernst & Young’s 2011 Africa Attractiveness Survey, Cape Town: Ernst & 
Young.  
Farley, P. (2011) ‘Introduction: next generation biofuels’, Nature 474, S2–S5, 23 June. 
Franco, J. (2010) ‘Assumptions in the European Union biofuels policy: frictions with experiences in Germany, Brazil 
and Mozambique’, The Journal of Peasant Studies 37(4): 661–698. 
FIAN (2010) ‘Land grabbing in Kenya and Mozambique: A report on two research missions –and a human rights 
analysis of land grabbing’, Heldelberg: FIAN. 
Fonseca, M. B., Burrell, A., Gay, H., Henseler, M., Kavallari, A., M’Barek, R., Pérez Domínguez, I., and Tonini, A. 
(2010) Impacts of the EU Biofuel Target on Agricultural Markets and Land Use: A Comparative Modelling Assessment, 
Seville: European Commission Joint Research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. 
FoEE (Friends of the Earth Europe) (2010) Africa: up for grabs. The scale and impact of land grabbing for agrofuels, 
Brussels: FoEE. 
Fthenakis, V., Mason, J.E. and Zweibel, K. (2009) ‘The technical, geographical, and economic feasibility of solar energy 
to supply the energy needs of the US’, Energy Policy 37: 387–399.  
Friis, C. and Reenberg, A. (2010) ‘Land grab in Africa: Emerging land system drivers in a teleconnected world’, GLP 
Report No. 1, Copenhagen: GLP-IPO. 
Galan-del-Castillo, E. and Velasquez, E. (2010) ‘From water to energy: the virtual water content and water footprint of 
biofuel consumption in Spain’, Energy Policy 38: 1345–1352. 
GNESD (2007) Reaching the Millennium Development Goals and Beyond: Access to Modern Forms of Energy as a 
Prerequisite, Roslkilde: Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development (GNESD). 
Gerbens-Leenes, P.W., Hoekstra, A.Y., and van der Meer, T.H. (2009) ‘The water footprint of energy from biomass: A 
quantitative assessment and consequences of an increasing share of bio-energy in energy supply’, Ecological 
Economics 68:1052–1060. 
Grether J. M., and de Melo, J. (2003) ‘Globalisation and Dirty Industries: Do Pollution Havens Matter?,’ NBER Working 
Papers 9776, Boston, MA: NBER. 
Sub-Saharan Africa in global trends of investment in renewable energy. Drivers and the challenge of the water-energy-land nexus 
53 
Görgen, M., Rudloff, B. Simons, J. Üllenberg, A., Väth, S. and Wimmer, L. (2009) Foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
land in developing countries, Tyskland: GTZ, Federal Ministry For Economic Cooperation and Development, Division 
45. 
GRAIN (2010) ‘Turning African Farmland Over to Big Business: The US’s Millennium Challenge Corporation’, Seedling, 
3–5 April. 
GTZ (2009a) ‘Jatropha Reality Check: A field assessment of the agronomic and economic viability of Jatropha and 
other oilseed crops in Kenya’, report prepared by Endelevu Energy, World Agroforestry Centre and Kenya Forestry 
Research Institute, Nairobi: GTZ. 
GTZ (2009b) ‘Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in land in developing countries’, Eschborn: GTZ. 
Hamilton, K. (2010) ‘Scaling up Renewable Energy in Developing Countries: finance and investment perspectives’, 
Energy, Environment & Resource Governance Programme Paper 02/10, London: Chatham House. 
Hammouda, H.B. and Osakwe, P. (2006) Financing development in Africa: trends, issues and challenges, ATPC Work in 
Progress No. 48, UNECA, December. 
HLPE (2011) Land tenure and international investments in agriculture: A report by the High Level Panel of Experts on 
Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security, Rome: HLPE. 
Hunsberger, C. (2010) ‘The politics of Jatropha-based biofuels in Kenya: convergence and divergence among NGOs, 
donors, government officials and farmers’, Journal of Peasant Studies 37(4): 939–962.  
IEA (2011) Energy Statistics for non-OECD Countries, Paris: International Energy Agency. 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2011) Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate 
Change Mitigation, available at http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/. 
Jacobson, M.Z. and Delucchi, A. (2011) ‘Providing all global energy with wind, water, andsolar power, Part I: 
Technologies, energy resources, quantities and areas of infrastructure, and materials’, Energy Policy 39: 1154–1169.  
Johnstone, N., Haščič, I. and D. Popp (2010) ‘Renewable energy policies and technological innovation: evidence based 
on patent counts’, Environmental and Resource Economics 45(1):133-155. 
Kemeny, T. (2010) ‘Does foreign direct investment drive technological upgrading?’, World Development 38(11):1543–
1554. 
Khadaroo, B. and Seetanah, A. J. (2007) ‘Foreign Direct Investment And Growth: New Evidences from Sub-Saharan 
African Countries’, paper presented at the CSAE Conference on ‘Economic Development in Africa’, University of Oxford, 
20–22 March. 
King, C.W. and Webber, M.E. (2008) ‘Water intensity of transportation’, Environmental Science and Technology 
42(21): 7866–7872. 
Kulichenko, N. and Wirth, J. (2011) ‘Regulatory and Financial Incentives for Scaling Up Concentrating Solar Power in 
Developing Countries’, Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper No. 24, Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Land Deal Brief (2011) Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa, Oakland, CA: The Oakland Institute. 
Lim, E.G. (2001) ‘Determinants of, and the relation between, foreign direct investment and growth: a summary of the 
recent literature’, IMF Working Paper No. 175, Washington, DC. 
López, R. (2011) ‘World Economic Crises: Commodity Prices and Environmental Scarcity As Missing Links’, in 
Proceedings of the 2010 ABCDE Conference, Stockholm, Sweden, June 1-3, 2010, Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Massa, I. (2011) ‘Sub-Saharan Africa in global trends of water investment drivers and the challenge of the private 
sector’, paper prepared for the 2011–2012 European Report on Development (draft). 
McKinsey Global Institute (2010) Lions on the move: The progress and potentials of African Economies, June. 
Mitchell, D. (2011) Biofuels in Africa: Opportunities, Prospects, and Challenges, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Modi, V., McDade, S., Lallement, D. and Saghir, J. (2005) Energy Services for the Millennium Development Goals, 
Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme, United Nations Development Programme, UN Millennium Project 
and World Bank, New York: World Bank & UNDP. 
Naudé, W. A. and Krugell, W.F. (2007) ‘Investigating geography and institutions as determinants of foreign direct 
investment in Africa using panel data’, Applied Economics 39 (10–12):1223–34. 
Ndikumana L. and Verick, S. (2008) ‘The Linkages between FDI and Domestic Investment: Unravelling the 
Developmental Impact of Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa’, IZA Discussion paper 3296, Bonn: IZA. 
Neudoerffer, R.C., Malhotra, P. and Ramana, P.V. (2001) ‘Participatory rural energy planning in India – a policy 
context’, Energy Policy 29(5): 371–381. 
Nhantumbo, I., and Salomão, A. (2010) Biofuels, Land Access and Rural Livelihoods in Mozambique, London: IIED. 
Nkwetta, D.N., Smyth, M., Van Thong, V., Driesen, J., and Belmans, R. (2010), ‘Electricity supply, irregularities, and 
the prospect for solar energy and energy sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Journal of Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy 2(2): 023102.  
Nouni, M.R., Mullick, S.C. and Kandpai, T.C. (2008) ‘Providing electricity access to remote areas in India: niche areas 
for decentralised electricity supply’, Renewable Energy 34(2): 430–434. 
Sub-Saharan Africa in global trends of investment in renewable energy. Drivers and the challenge of the water-energy-land nexus 
54 
 
Norwegian People’s Aid (2011) ‘The New Frontier. A baseline survey of large-scale land-based investment in Southern 
Sudan’, Oslo: NPA. 
ODDO (2010) ‘Land grabbing, myth or reality?’ Paris: ODDO Securities. 
OECD/AfDB (2010) African Economic Outlook 2010, Paris: OECD & AfDB. 
OECD, AfDB, UNECA, UNDP (2011) African Economic Outlook 2011: Africa and its Emerging Partners, Paris: OECD & 
AfDB. 
OECD/IEA (2010) World Energy Outlook, Paris: International Energy Agency.  
OECD/IEA (2011) Clean Energy Progress Report, Paris: International Energy Agency.  
Odhiambo, M. O. (2011) Commercial pressures on land in Africa: A regional overview of opportunities, challenges, and 
impacts, International Land Coalition, Commercial Pressure on Land, Rome: ILC. 
Ölz, S. and Beerepoot, M. (2010) Deploying Renewables in Southeast Asia: Trends and potentials, Paris: OECD & IEA. 
OPEC (2010) World Oil Outlook 2010, Vienna: OPEC. 
Openshaw, K. (2010) ‘Can Biomass Power Development?’, IIED Gatekeeper 144, London: IIED. 
Practical Action Consulting (2009) ‘Small-Scale Bioenergy Initiatives: Brief description and preliminary lessons on 
livelihood impacts from case studies in Asia, Latin America and Africa’, prepared for PISCES and FAO by Practical 
Action Consulting. 
Razafimahefa, I. and Hamori, S. (2005) ‘An empirical analysis of FDI competitiveness in sub-Saharan Africa and 
developing countries,’ Economics Bulletin 6: 1–8.  
Radelet, S. (2010) ‘Emerging Africa: how 17 countries are leading the way’, Washington, DC: Center for Global 
Development. 
Richardson, B (2010) ‘Big sugar in southern Africa: rural development and the perverted potential of sugar/ethanol 
exports’, Journal of Peasant Studies 37(4): 917–38. 
Reiter, S.L. and Steensma, H. K. (2010) ‘Human development and foreign direct investment in developing countries: 
the influence of FDI policy and corruption’, World Development 38(12): 1678–1691.  
REN21 – Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (2011) Renewables 2011 Global Status Report, Paris: 
REN21 Secretariat. 
Romijn, H.A. (2011) ‘Land clearing and greenhouse gas emissions from Jatropha biofuels on African Miombo 
Woodlands’, Energy Policy 39(10): 5751–5762.  
Schoneveld, G.C., German, L.A. and Nukator, E. (2010) ‘Towards Sustainable Biofuel Development: Assessing the 
Local Impacts of Large-Scale Foreign Land Acquisitions in Ghana’, paper prepared for World Bank Annual Conference 
on Land Policy and Administration, Washington, DC, 26–27 April. 
Smaller, C. and Mann, H. (2009) A thirst for distant land: Foreign investment in agricultural land and water, Winnipeg: 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). 
Sulle, E. and Nelson F. (2009) Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in Tanzania, London: IIED. 
The Oakland Institute (2011) Understanding land investments in Africa, Sierra Leone, Oakland, CA: The Oakland 
Institute. 
Thiam, D.R. (2010) ‘Renewable decentralised in developing countries: appraisal from microgrids project in Senegal’, 
Renewable Energy 35(8): 1615–1623. 
Timilsina, G. R. and Shrestha, A. (2010) ‘Biofuels: Markets, Targets and Impacts’, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Papers 5364, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
UNCTAD (2001) World Investment Report, New York & Geneva: United Nations. 
UNCTAD (2005) Economic Development in Africa – Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct Investments, New York & 
Geneva: United Nations. 
UNCTAD (2009) World Investment Report – Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, 
New York & Geneva: United Nations.  
UNCTAD (2011) World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development, New 
York & Geneva: United Nations. Also available at: http://www.unctad.org/  
UNECA (2011) Economic Report on Africa 2011. Governing development in Africa – the role of the state in economic 
transformation, Addis Ababa: UNECA. 
UN Energy (2005) ‘The Energy Challenge for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals’, UN Energy Paper, New 
York: United Nations.  
UNEP and BNEF (2011) Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2011. Analysis of Trends and Issues in the 
Financing of Renewable Energy, available at http://www.fs-unep-centre.org/.  
UNEP and MISI (2009) Why Clean Energy Public Investment Makes Economic Sense - The Evidence Base, available at 
http://www.unep.org.  
Sub-Saharan Africa in global trends of investment in renewable energy. Drivers and the challenge of the water-energy-land nexus 
55 
van Gelder, J.W. and German, L. (2011) ‘Biofuel finance: Global trends in biofuel finance in forest-rich countries of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America and implications for governance’, CIFOR infobriefs, No. 36, January, Bogor: CIFOR.  
Vermeulen, S. and Cotula, L. (2010) ‘Over the heads of local people: consultation, consent, and recompense in large-
scale land deals for biofuels projects in Africa’, Journal of Peasant Studies 37(4): 899–916. 
von Braun J. (2008) ‘Food and Financial Crises: Implications for Agriculture and the Poor’, Brief prepared for the 
CGIAR annual general meeting, Maputo, December  
von Braun, J. and Meinzen-Dick, R. (2009) ‘Land grabbing’ by foreign investors in developing countries: Risks and 
opportunities, IFPRI Policy Brief 13, Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
von Maltitz, G., Haywood, L., Mapako, M., and Brent, A. (2009) ‘Analysis of opportunities for biofuel production in sub-
Saharan Africa’, CIFOR Environmental Services Briefs, Bogor: CIFOR.  
von Maltitz, G. and Stafford, W. (2011) Assessing opportunities and constraints for biofuel development in sub-
Saharan Africa, CIFOR Working Paper 58, Bogor: CIFOR. 
Warnholz, J.-L. (2008) ‘Is investment in Africa low despite high profits?’ CSAE WPS/2008-3, available at: 
http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid%3A4554a673-c330-4336-9edd-6ad44a6a41fd.  
Watson, H.K. (2011) ‘Potential to expand sustainable bioenergy from sugarcane in southern Africa’, Energy Policy 39: 
5746–5750. 
Wooster, R.B. and Diebel, D.S. (2010) ‘Productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment in developing countries: a 
meta-regression analysis’, Review of Development Economics 14(s1): 640–655. 
Woodhouse, P. and Ganho, S. (2011) ‘Is water the hidden agenda of agricultural land acquisition in SSA’, Paper 
presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, University of Sussex, 6–8 April.  
World Bank (2007) ‘Agriculture for Development’, World Development Report 2008, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Commission on Dams (2000) Dams and Development – A New Framework for Decision-Making, London & 
Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 
World Energy Council (2010a) 2010 Survey of Energy Resources, London: WEC. 
World Energy Council (2010b) Water for Energy, London: WEC. 
Yang, H., Zhou, Y. and Liu, J. (2009) ‘Land and water requirements of biofuels and implications for food supply and 
the environment in China’, Energy Policy 37(5): 1876–1885. 
Zuk, M., Rojas, L., Blanco, S., Serrano, P., Cruz, J., Angeles, F. , Tzintzun, G., Armendariz, C., Edwards, R.D., 
Johnson, V., Riojas-Rodriguez, H. and Masera, O. (2007) ‘The impact of improved wood-burning stoves on fine 
particulate matter concentrations in rural Mexican homes’, Journal of Exposure Science and Environmental 
Epidemiology 17(3): 224–232. 
 
